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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Auditor report lag (ARL) is defined as the number of days from the financial year end to the date 
of the audit report completed (Bamber, Bamber, & Schoderbek, 1993 ; Chambers & Penman, 
1984; Habiba & Bhuiyanb, 2011; Hassan, 2016 ; Knechel Robert & Payne, 2001). 
Demutualization is the separation of the management structures of a company’s commercial and 
regulatory functions in line with the Capital Markets Regulations of 2012 (GoK, 2012). 
Corporate Governance  is the institutional, legal and regulatory framework that governs the 
relationship between managers and investors in a firm whether it be private, publicly traded or 
state owned (ACGN, 2016; Demise, 2006; Waweru & Riro, 2013) . 
Corporate Governance Quality is the adherence of corporate governance standards set by 
authorities   (Lokman, Mula, & Cotter, 2014 ; Waweru & Riro, 2013). It is further defined in terms 
of the composition of the board and its activities (Jayanthi Krishnan, 2005). 
Profit warning is defined as earnings forecasts made by management that warn of an expected 
earnings shortfall in relation to a relevant standard. This standard may be an analysis forecast, a 
















Despite the time taken by external auditors to release the audit report (herein referred to as the 
auditor report lag, ARL) being regarded as a significant qualitative aspect of timely financial 
reporting, little known about the determinants of ARL in listed companies in developing 
economies. This study sought to investigate the determinants of ARL in companies listed in Kenya. 
A descriptive research design was used to study the auditor-related factors, company-specific 
factors and corporate governance factors affecting ARL. Two-stage panel least squares regressions 
were performed to establish the drivers of ARL. The study focused on a ten-year period from 2006 
to 2015. The findings revealed that auditor type was the most significant auditor related factor that 
was associated with ARL. In terms of company-specific factors, the return on assets (ROA) was 
significant and negatively associated with ARL. In terms of industry sector, the study found that 
listed companies in the banking sector had lower ARLs. Similarly, companies in the manufacturing 
sector had lower ARLs. The study found that listed companies in the investment sector had longer 
ARLs. Next, the study found that listed companies with a higher corporate governance score had 
shorter ARL. The findings revealed that there exists auditor-specific, company-specific and 
corporate governance influences on ARL. To corroborate findings from secondary data, semi-
structured questionnaires were used. The findings from the questionnaires demonstrated that 
alongside auditor-, company- and corporate governance-related factors, there are also regulatory 
factors influencing ARL. The findings should be of interest to managers, auditors and policy 
makers because these results may help the assessment of the influence of such variables on 
improving the timeliness of audit reports. Despite the study focusing on ARL in a single country-





CHAPTER ONE   
        INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
This chapter outlines the background of the study perspective by describing ARL and the 
timeliness of financial reporting information, ARL in Kenya and the auditing and regulatory 
framework in Kenya. It also outlined the problem statement and the research objectives. The 
chapter concludes with the scope and significance of the study.  For a well-functioning capital 
market timely financial reports are a necessity and undue delay in releasing these reports 
increases uncertainty in decision making for investors (Afify, 2009 ; Ashton, Willingham, & 
Elliott, 1987). Changes in technology and business practices especially corporate governance 
practices have propelled the need to have timely accounting information. Moreover, policy 
makers such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have also raised concerns 
about the timeliness of public information disclosures (FASB, 2008). Therefore, this study 
examined the drivers of auditor report lag (ARL) in companies listed in the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange (NSE). 
1.1.1 ARL and the timeliness of financial reporting information 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Committee Board (PCAOB) defines an audit 
report as an independent examination and expression of opinion on the financial statements of 
a company’s annual report. The aim of an audit is to independently verify the content and 
preparation of the company’s financial statements according to the standards, legislation, 
regulations and requirements (PCAOB, 2016). The timeliness of audited annual reports is 
important to investors because it influences the usefulness of information available to investors 
for decision making (Alkhatib & Marji, 2012). Audit Report Lag (ARL) has been defined by 
various authors as the number of days from the financial year end to the audit report date (Habib 
& Bhuiyanb, 2011; Hassan, 2016; Knechel Robert & Payne, 2001). ARL is one of the few 
external variables that allow stakeholders to gauge the efficiency of audit ( Habib & Bhuiyanb, 
2011; Hassan, 2016).  
The timeliness of audited financial reporting has been a concern for various stakeholders, 
including shareholders, managers, and regulators, as well as internal and external auditors 
(Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2012; Krishnan & Yang, 2009). In the Kenyan perspective 
timeliness of audited financial statements is prescribed by the Company Act, 2015 as six 





required to submit annual reports within three months or approximately ninety days from 
financial year end. ARL has elicited interest among researchers because timeliness is a critical 
qualitative aspect of financial reporting (FASB, 2008) and also enhances decision making 
quality (Afify, 2009; Al-Ajmi, 2008). Timely reporting serves to reduce unfavorable effects of 
moral hazard and the implications of adverse selection (Leventis, Weetman, & Weetmann, 
2004). Prior studies posit that delays in reporting present opportunities for insider trading and 
misappropriation or misapplication of corporate assets (Leventis et al., 2004).  
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) views timeliness as an “ancillary aspect” 
of relevance and further suggests that a lack of timeliness can rob information of relevance it 
might otherwise have had (FASB, 2008). Therefore, delayed disclosure of accounting 
information allows a subset of investors to acquire costly private pre-disclosure information 
that would lead to the “well informed” investors exploiting their private information at the 
detriment of the less informed investors (Afify, 2009). The usefulness of Accounting 
information is dependent on completeness, accuracy, reliability and timeliness of accounting 
information (Wisna, 2013). Timeliness is a critical qualitative aspect of financial reporting 
(FASB, 2008) and also enhances decision making quality (Hassan, 2016). Timely audited 
financial information improves pricing of securities (Gul, Kim, & Qiu, 2010), and limits insider 
trading and spread of rumors in the market (Owusu-Ansah, 2000). 
ARL has been identified as the single most important determinant of timeliness in earnings 
announcement (Leventis & Weetman, 2005 ; Owusu-Ansah, 2000), which in turn, determines 
the market reaction to earnings announcement (Gul et al., 2010). Other researchers have argued 
that the longer the ARL the higher the likelihood of unscrupulous behavior in the market 
(Bamber et al., 1993). When the audit report is delayed it worsens the information asymmetry 
between managers and stakeholders and increases the uncertainty in investment decisions. 
Consequently, this may adversely affect investors' confidence in the capital market. 
Unexpected reporting lag may be associated with lower quality information. Determinants that 
cause the difference in timing of  corporate disclosures have been an area of interest to 
researchers for many years (Knechel Robert & Payne, 2001). 
Given the importance of ARL to investors and stakeholders, identifying the determinants of 
ARL continues to attract the attention of researchers as illustrated in recent studies (Bonson-
Ponte, Escobar-Rodriguez & Borrero-Dominguez, 2008; Ettredge, Li & Sun, 2006; Hassan, 





developing and developed economies no one study on ARL that has had its findings 
generalized for other countries (Bokpin & Isshaq, 2009; McGee, 2009; Waweru & Uliana, 
2005). ARL is also expected to vary cross-sectionally because of firm and audit-specific 
characteristics such as firm size, profitability, corporate governance, audit tenure, auditor 
independence (Bédard & Gendron, 2010 ; Habib & Bhuiyanb, 2011). An understanding of the 
possible determinants of the ARL likely would provide insights into audit efficiency. In 
developing countries the most reliable source and reference of accounting information is 
audited financial statements (Alkhatib & Marji, 2012). Prior research posits that there are 
marked socio-economic, cultural and political differences between developing and developed 
economies  (Bokpin & Isshaq, 2009; McGee, 2009; Waweru & Uliana, 2005). 
Prior research has focused on identifying and expanding variables that determine ARL and 
their findings indicate that the ARL is affected by Corporate Governance characteristics for 
instance, board independence, audit committee independence, number of meetings, size and  
CEO duality (Apadore & Mohd Noor, 2013; Baatwah, Salleh, & Ahmad, 2015; Henderson & 
Kaplan, 2000). Type of news such as audit opinion and profit warning (Ahmad & Kamarudin, 
2003; Hossain & Taylor, 2008; Wermert et al., 2000). Auditor  and  firm characteristics such 
as firm profitability, audit tenure and audit specialization (Apadore & Mohd Noor, 2013 ; Dao 
& Pham, 2014;  Waweru et al., 2015). However, studies have not incorporated the aspect of 
corporate governance and audit committee quality as drivers of ARL. Therefore this study also 
sought to investigate the influence of corporate governance and audit committee quality as 
corporate governance-related factors on ARL. 
1.1.2 ARL in Kenya and the regulatory provisions 
Kenya being an emerging economy is characterized by weak institutions such as poorly 
enforced governance systems, corruption and minimal democracy. This provides an ideal 
setting to explore the importance of firm and country characteristics in corporate governance 
because of their unique structures (Hugill & Siegel, 2014). Weak institutions can impact a 
country’s growth and along with it the ability to compete globally (Acemoglu, Johnson, & 
Robinson, 2001; Beck, Ross, & Loayza, 2000). Kenyans have witnessed numerous companies 
struggle financially due to weak corporate governance the most recent being Uchumi 
supermarkets, Imperial bank, Dubai bank (Ngugi, 2016; Wasuna, 2015, 2016). Weak corporate 
governance structures may significantly affect the ARL (Afify, 2009). An involuntary change 





& Barua, 2010). This phenomenon has been seen in Uchumi supermarkets which has delayed 
the release of its audit reports extending the lag to six months (Ngugi, 2016). The investor is 
left assuming that there is bad news being concealed by managers of the company (Carslaw & 
Kaplan, 1991) because one way of delaying bad news is delaying the audit report (Alkhatib & 
Marji, 2012; Patrick & Benjamin, 1994). 
The Kenyan education sector has experienced some radical reforms in 2016 which saw the 
release of national examinations earlier than the norm (Ayiro, 2016 ; Wanzala, 2016). Some 
stakeholders see this as a move that has brought back credibility because fraudulent individuals 
have no time to alter results (Otieno, 2016). However, other stakeholders view this as 
compromising on the quality of marking since it’s done within a very short period (Onsongo, 
2017). Similarly, reducing the time taken to release audit reports improves the credibility of 
financial statements (Owusu-Ansah, 2000), however, care must be taken not to compromise 
audit quality (Robert Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, & Velury, 2013).  
The Companies Act 2015 No. 17 of 2015 formerly Companies Act Chapter 486 and the Code 
of Corporate Practices for Issuers of Securities for the Public formerly Corporate Governance 
Guidelines were introduced in 2015 to regulated listed companies. The Act, under section 688, 
lays out the framework for documents that publicly listed companies in Kenya are required to 
file with the registrar of companies. The Companies Act Chapter 486 was amended and now 
incorporates the duration required to submit audit reports to the registrar of companies, that is, 
six months from fiscal year end, failure to which each director of the company who is in default 
commits an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand 
shillings (GoK, 2015). 
 
The Code of Corporate Practices for Issuers of Securities for the Public 2015 sets out the 
principles and specific recommendations on structure and processes, which listed companies 
should adopt in making good corporate governance an integral part of their business dealings 
and culture. The constitution of Kenya Chapter Four section 27 (8) promulgated in 2010 now 
requires that in any elective or appointed body no more than two thirds shall be of one gender. 
As of 31st December 2016, Kenya had sixty six public listed companies (NSE, 2016). Seven 
are classified in the Agricultural sector, three in the Automobiles and Accessories sector, 
eleven in the Banking sector, five in the Energy and Petroleum sector, twelve in the 





Trust sector, five in the Construction and Allied sector, four in the Investment sector, one in 
the Investment Services sector, ten in the Manufacturing and Allied sector, one in the 
Telecommunication and Technology. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The timely release of audited financial statements is important because it brings out two 
qualitative characteristics of financial accounting information: relevance and reliability 
(FASB, 2008). Today’s society is highly reactionary to information and this has been amplified 
due to the advancements in technology where platforms have been created to ease access of 
stakeholders to financial information  (Sultana, Singh, & Mitchell Van der Zahn, 2015). These 
technological advancements such as, online trading platforms have reduced capital flow 
barriers and increased market integration; however, they have also contributed to greater 
market volatility (Sultan, 2015). Consequently, the demand to timely release of audit reports is 
ever more essential. 
Some researchers posit that longer ARLs are perceived as bad news to investors because of the 
likelihood of fraudulent behavior (Rezaei & Shahroodi, 2015) while other researchers argue 
that a longer audit lag can be good news to investors when the effectiveness of fraud detection 
is high (Yim, 2010). Therefore, this inconclusively in findings puts auditors and management 
of listed companies under pressure to release audit reports without undue delay. Inconsistency 
in findings has also been cited where bank size, a company specific characteristic is negatively 
associated with ARL when using a cross-sectional approach but positively associated when 
using a longitudinal approach (Henderson & Kaplan, 2000). 
The delay in releasing audit reports is causing information asymmetry in the Kenyan market. 
An example is the case of Uchumi Supermarkets Limited which has delayed the release of its 
audit report for days which has seen its share price fall from in September 2016 (Ksh 3.35) to 
in May 2017 (Ksh. 2.95) (NSE, 2017). From an investors’ perspective, a lengthy audit delay 
could suggest there has been a deterioration in the quality of client-auditor interaction which 
could translate into an auditor change, and a negative stock market reaction (Krishnamurthy, 
Zhou, & Zhou, 2006). Developing countries have different institutional set-ups as compared to 
developed countries (Che-Ahmad & Abidin, 2009). Kenya being a developing country is faced 
with challenges of weak corporate governance structures hence, the need to conduct this study. 
Furthermore, it is important to study drivers of ARL because it affects the timeliness of 





Bhuiyan, 2011; Hassan, 2016). Due to information asymmetry brought about by ARL in the 
market the study analyzed a broad spectrum of auditor-, company- and corporate governance-
related characteristics to identify which variables influence the ARL.  
1.3 Main Research Objective 
The main objective of this study was to examine the drivers of ARL by listed companies in 
Kenya. 
1.3.1 Specific Objectives 
The study sought to address the following objectives: 
1. To analyze the influence of auditor-related factors on ARL by listed companies in Kenya. 
2. To examine the effect of company-related factors on ARL by Kenyan listed companies. 
3. To analyze the influence of corporate governance related factors by listed companies in 
Kenya. 
4. To obtain practitioners perspectives on the drivers of ARL by listed companies in Kenya. 
1.4 Research questions 
The study sought to answer the following research questions: 
1. What is the influence of auditor-related factors on ARL by listed companies in Kenya? 
2. What is the effect of company-related factors on ARL by Kenyan listed companies? 
3. What is the influence of corporate governance-related factors on ARL by listed companies 
in Kenya? 
4. What do practitioners perceive of drivers of ARL among listed companies in Kenya? 
1.5 Scope of the Study  
The study seeks to examine the determinants of ARL among listed companies in Kenya. The 
study was limited to 424 observations from 44 companies listed on the NSE that is, from 1st 
January 2006 to 31st December 2015. The study also sought responses from external auditors 








1.6 Significance of the study 
The findings of this study are significant in the following ways: 
1.6.1 To investors 
The study examines the determinants of ARL in Kenyan listed companies. This information is 
useful in guiding investors in adjusting their investment preferences, on companies listed in 
the NSE, in good time (Dodd, Dopuch, Holthausen, & Leftwich, 1984). The findings of this 
study will also improve investor confidence in the capital markets by the timeliness of earnings 
information, which is affected by the ARL (Bamber et al., 1993; Ettredge, Li, & Sun, 2006).  
 
 
1.6.2 To Auditors 
Knowledge on the determinants of ARL is likely to provide more insights into audit efficiency 
(Leventis, Weetman, & Caramanis, 2005; Walker & Hay, 2007). The findings of this study 
will aid auditors in having a better understanding of what factors drive the ARL in Kenya. 
1.6.3 To Researchers and academicians 
The study is structured to examine the determinants of ARL in a Kenyan context which differ 
cross-sectional from other countries due to firm and audit specific characteristics (Habib & 
Bhuiyanb, 2011). Therefore, the findings of this study will extend literature on the knowledge 
of determinants of ARL in the Kenyan perspective. Using mixed method of research the study 
aims at providing information on the determinants of ARL in a developing country. 
 1.6.4 To Policy makers and regulators 
Policy makers play an important role in ensuring companies adheres to timely financial 
reporting. Knowledge on the drivers of ARL may help inform policy makers such as ICPAK 










CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on determinants of ARL of 
Kenyan listed companies. The study considered agency theory, signaling theory and the 
stakeholder theory. The relationship between theoretical and empirical literature was discussed 
to establish the relationships among the variables. The chapter includes a conceptual 
framework to further show the linkage between the variables. A summary of the literature will 
highlight the literature gaps and form basis of this study. 
2.2 Extant theories on ARL and its determinants 
This study drew from agency theory, signaling theory and stakeholder theory. The theories 
guided the formulation of dependent and independent variables. The agency theory and the 
stakeholder theory informed the independent variables; auditor-related factors; corporate-
governance related factors and company specific factors because auditors are agents appointed 
by shareholders, corporate governance practices are meant to protect stakeholders interests.  
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory was developed as a result of researchers exploring risk-sharing among 
cooperating individuals. It was found that an agency problem is one that arises as a result of 
cooperating parties having different attitudes towards risk (Arrow, 1971; Eisenhardt, 1989 ; 
Wilson, 1968) or one that occurs due to cooperating parties differ in terms of goals and division 
of labor (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 ; Ross, 1973). An agency relationship has been defined as 
the contractual relationship that arise when one or more persons (principles) engage another 
(agents) to perform certain services on their behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Separation 
between the owners and control leads to a potential conflict between the agents (managers) and 
principles (agents) (Aboagye-Otchere, Bedi, & Kwakye, 2012; Hassan, 2016) . The theory 
holds that agents (managers) will always act in their own self-interest and this is  further 
encouraged by the asymmetrical information between agents and principals (Urquiza, Navarro, 
Trombetta, & Lara, 2010). 
The agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems the first being the contention that 
arises when the shareholders and managers have diverse desires. The second problem 





different attitudes towards risk because of the different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). In 
order to alleviate the self-interest actions of managers the agency theory posits that good 
corporate governance should be implemented (Errunza & Miller, 2000). The agency theory 
posits that the main role of financial reporting is to monitor the quality of management 
emphasizing on the need for proper governance structures to ensure that managers act in the 
best interest of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The Agency theory posits that the principal-agent conflict can arise due to information 
asymmetry caused by ARL, it further argues that reduction of ARL may help reduce 
information asymmetry between the principal and agent thus reducing the principal-agent 
conflict. The agency theory provides a unique, realistic and empirically testable perspective on 
problems arising due to the principal-agent relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory has 
been applied to the organizational phenomena positivist and principle-agent (Eisenhardt, 1989 
; Jensen, 1983). The positivist researchers focused on identifying conflict situations between 
principal and agent arising due to different goals and prescribing governance mechanisms the 
limit the agent’s self-serving behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal-agent researcher 
focused on determining the optimal contract, behavior versus outcome between principal and 
agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal-agent theory in comparison to the positivist theory is 
abstract and mathematical, therefore, beyond the reach of organizations and scholars 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, this study employs a positivist approach of the agency theory 
which will identify the corporate governance mechanisms that have been put in place to remedy 
principal agent conflicts in a Kenyan perspective. 
Prior studies on the determinants of ARL have employed the agency theory because it provides  
unique, realistic and empirically testable perspective on principle agent problems  (Bamber, 
Bamber, & Schoderbek, 1993; Waweru et al., 2015).  Agency theory is useful in this study in 
that it informs the determinants of ARL: auditor-related factors such as auditor type, corporate 
governance-related factors such as presence and size of audit committee and company-related 
factors such as ownership concentration, firm size, profitability and industry. Afify (2009) 
while utilising agency theory found that existance of an audit committee, size of the firm , 
industry and profitability significantly affected the ARL in Malaysia. Similary, Eghliaow 
(2013) found that company size, industry and auditor type were significant. Apadore and Mohd 
Noor (2013) found that audit committee size, ownership concentration, firm size and 





2.2.2 Signaling theory 
Signaling theory was developed  by Spence (1973) and advanced by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) to explain behavior in labor markets but can also be used to explain the concept of 
timely financial reporting. Signaling is a reaction to information asymmetry in financial 
markets; in this case, companies have information that investors don’t have (Watson, Shrives, 
& Marston, 2002). The signaling theory is mainly concerned with reducing information 
asymmetry between two parties (Spence, 2002). Under the signaling theory, information 
asymmetry can be reduced if one party signals the other. In this case, managers of higher 
quality firms will want to distinguish themselves from lower quality through timely financial 
reporting (Leventis et al., 2004). For the signaling effect to be successful the news needs to be 
credible. If managers falsely try to signal news that they are of high quality when in fact they 
are of low quality and it is eventually revealed, subsequent financial reporting will not be 
viewed as credible (Watson et al., 2002). Managers must also decide whether or not to 
communicate news that may either be positive or negative to stakeholders in a timely manner 
(Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). Companies that reports profits communicate to 
investors that they have a bright future ahead and are worth investing in. 
Signaling theory has been used in prior studies in auditing and accounting because it is useful 
in describing the behavior between two parties who have access to different information 
(Rezaei & Shahroodi, 2015). The signaling theory posits that management may signal 
something about the firm through various aspects of information disclosure such as the release 
of audit reports. The timing of the release of audit reports may be viewed as a signal by 
investors of how the firm is performing. Early release of audit reports may be viewed as good 
news and may affect the firm’s value positively. Late release of audit reports may be viewed 
as bad news and may negatively affect the firm’s value. The information signaling theory has 
informed the selection of board independence, leverage, complexity, firm size and profitability. 
Shamsul-Nahar (2007) using signaling theory investigated the role board of directors and audit 
committee on the timeliness of reporting. The study found that board independence, leverage 
and profitability were significantly associated with ARL. Similarly, Mukhtaruddin, Oktarina, 
Relasari, and Abukosim (2015) examined the influence of firm size and complexity. The study 
found that firm size was significant. However, complexity was not significant leaving room for 
further studies on determinants of ARL in different countries and institutional set-up to 





2.2.3 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory was developed by Freeman (1984) who argued that organizations are 
accountable to the shareholders as well as other stakeholders which is contrary to the traditional 
view that shareholders were the only stakeholders of a company. Stakeholders are groups or 
individuals who may benefit or be harmed by activities of a company. These stakeholders have 
contrasting interests which have to be taken into account when releasing the audit reports. This 
is important because their varying interests can affect the company’s ability to achieve its 
objectives (Freeman, 2001).  The stakeholder theory concerns itself with the trying to meet the 
expectations of these different stakeholders by employing strategies that could help achieve 
this problem such as good corporate governance practices. Therefore, it is implied that the 
directors and auditors of a company have a duty of care to the stakeholders. Stakeholders may 
bring action against the directors and auditors for failure of exercising due care. 
The stakeholder theory can also be used to explain the effect of ARL on the share returns in 
the sense that, ARL can be increased because managers have an incentive to delay release of 
audit reports due to mandatory statutory disclosures that prevent them from hiding bad news 
(Watts, 1992). Stakeholder theory suggests that the delay of audit reports sends a ‘silent signal’ 
for shareholder to divest their firms’ shares before the news reaches the market. On the other 
hand, shorter ARLs imply that good news is released into the market before other source 
discloses this news (Mahajan & Chander, 2008; Nor Izah Ku Ismail & Chandler, 2004). The 
stakeholder theory argues that stakeholders such as regulator can influence the ARL by 
implementing policies that reduce ARL so as to ensure timely financial reporting. This theory 
was instrumental in identifying ARL as having a potential influence on the profitability, 
growth, age, leverage, and audit firm size. Al-tahat (2015) employed stakeholder theory to 
investigate the association of ARL firm size, profitability, leverage, and auditor type. The study 
found a significant relationship between profitability, auditor type and ARL.  
2.3 Empirical Review 
This section will discuss prior literature on the key variables of this study that is, the ARL, 
auditor-related factors, corporate governance related factors and stock returns and preparers’ 
perspective. Prior studies have identified drivers of ARL as auditor-related factors, company-
related factors and corporate governance related factors (Afify, 2009; Eghliaow, 2013; Hassan, 
2016). These factors are different in different countries due to the different institutional set-up 





2.3.1 Background of ARL 
Research on ARL commenced about 41 years ago and some of the earliest studies were done 
by Courtis, (1976) and Gilling (1977) in New Zealand, by Davis & Whittred (1980) in Australia 
, in the US by Garsombke (1981) and Canada by Ashton, Graul, & Newton (1989). Ashton, 
Willingham, & Elliot (1987) conducted a research to determine the association between ARL 
with corporate characteristics. Their findings indicated that ARL is positively associated with 
the client's revenue and business complexity, but is negatively related with client status 
(represented by one for companies traded on an organized exchange or over the counter, and 
zero otherwise), quality of internal control (rated one if auditor judged the internal control 
quality as "virtually none" and five if "excellent") and relative mix of audit job (rated one if all 
audit work performed subsequent to year end and four if most work performed prior to year-
end).    
Prior studies found that firms that report losses have a longer ARL (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991 ; 
Courtis, 1976). ARL is influenced by an auditor's business risk associated with the client and 
audit specific events that are expected to require additional audit work such as extraordinary 
items, net losses and qualified audit opinions (Bamber et al., 1993) and also found that large 
clients have a shorter audit lag. Audit lag increased for companies that switched their auditor 
late in the fiscal year (Schwartz & Soo, 1996). This result is consistent with their expectation 
that companies change their auditor early in their fiscal year for positive reasons, whereas late 
auditor switching is driven by extended auditor client negotiations or opinion shopping, which 
leads to longer audit lag.   
Studies on audit lag in the banking sector revealed that a financial institution takes less time to 
issue an audit report because it operates in a highly regulated industry (Henderson & Kaplan, 
2000). Some researchers suggest that any attempts to regulate more closely the timeliness of 
audited financial reports should focus on audit-specific issues (e.g., audit fees or audit hours, 
proxied by the presence of extraordinary items in the income statement, the number of remarks 
in the subject to/except for audit opinions) rather than on the audit client's characteristics. They 
find that the type of auditors, audit fees, number of remarks in audit report, extraordinary items 
and uncertainty of opinion in the audit report are statistically significant in explaining 





2.3.2 Determinants of ARL  
This section discusses prior literature on drivers of ARL. The drivers of ARL were grouped 
into auditor-, company specific-, and corporate governance-related factors.   
2.3.2.1 Influence of auditor-related characteristics on ARL 
Simunic (1980) pioneered the study on determinants of audit fees. A meta-analysis of audit 
fees classified audit fees into three categories, that is, firm (client), auditor and engagement 
attributes (Hay, Knechel, & Wong, 2006). The rise of accounting scandals has seen an increase 
in public interest in corporate governance seen by recent studies examining board and audit 
committee characteristics as determinants of audit fees (Abbott, Parker, Peters, & 
Raghunandan, 2003; Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, & Riley, 2002). Prior studies related to audit 
fees have highlighted two schools of thought on audit pricing (Agus et al., 2015). One school 
of thought views audit fees from the supply side perspective that links audit fees and audit risk. 
Based on this perspective audit fees are seen as a proxy for audit efficiency (Masli, Peters, 
Richardson, & Sanchez, 2010; Raghunandan & Rama, 2006). Audit fees are a result of a 
production function where the existence of a strong internal control environment decreases the 
amount of audit fees, consequentially reducing the time taken to release the audit report  (Agus 
et al., 2015; Simunic, 1980). This theoretical model however assumes a constant demand for 
audit and does not take into account the different demand forces that determine audit fees (Agus 
et al., 2015). 
The second school of thought views audit pricing from the demand side where the demand 
from audit services is a function of a set of risk factors that stakeholders with interest on the 
outcome of the audit fee (Hay et al., 2006). The demand for audit services is expected to 
increase as the number of stakeholders interested in the outcome of the audit increases; this is 
evidenced by the level of stakeholder involvement in corporate governance decisions. The 
demand for audit services increases because those charged with governance need to protect 
their interests (Knechel & Willekens, 2006). This school of thought sees audit fees as a proxy 
for audit quality. In conclusion, the discussion above shows the need to investigate the effect 
of fee on the ARL in the Kenyan environment. 
Auditor type refers to the size of the audit firm whether it can be classified under the big four 
or not. Companies audited by big four audit firms tend to have shorter audit lags as compared 
to non-big four audit firms (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991). This is attributed to the vast resources 





certain sectors  that increases their efficiency (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991). In Libya it was found 
that firms audited by big audit firms have shorter lags (Eghliaow, 2013) contrary to a similar 
study in Malaysia which concluded that the auditor type was an insignificant variable (Apadore 
& Mohd Noor, 2013). 
Prior studies show that once a risky client leave a Big 4 audit firm, that firm has to seek audit 
services in a non-Big 4 audit firm. This is because Big 4 audit firms have more to lose from 
litigation and may suffer a great blow to their reputation from an audit failure than non-Big 4 
audit firms (Jones & Raghunandan, 1998; Mande & Son, 2011). Studies have shown that Big 
4 audit firms are less dependent on one clients audit fees (Watkins, Hillison, & Morecroft, 
2004). Therefore, clients dropped by one Big 4 audit firm are less likely to be accepted by 
another Big 4 audit firm because of the client risks that all Big 4 audit firms try to avoid (Mande 
& Son, 2011). From an investor perspective, when a Big 4 audit firm drops a company as a 
client signals a possibility of auditor-client conflict that may lead to a lengthy audit delay that 
leads to a negative stock price reaction (Krishnamurthy et al., 2006). 
Big 4 audit firms dropping a risky client does not reflect positive from a social perspective 
because non-Big 4 audit firms now have to audit these risky clients. Non-Big audit firms 
provide lesser monitoring of the financial reporting process than Big audit firms (Cassell, 
GirouxG., Myers, & Omer, 2007). This could lead to a reduction in the audit quality due to the 
increase likelihood of audit failures (Mande & Son, 2011). Audit risk is also usually high when 
an auditor is auditing a client for the first time because the auditor needs to incur extra effort 
and time in learning the business processes and financial reporting systems (Flanigan, 2002; 
Tanyi et al., 2010). This usually leads to a longer audit delay (Tanyi et al., 2010). Prior studies 
measure audit risk as the ratio of current liabilities to current assets  (Sultana et al., 2015). This 
discussion motivated formulation of the following hypothesis. 
H1: Auditor-related characteristics has a positive influence ARL (audit fees, audit risk and 
auditor type). 
2.3.2.2 Influence of company-specific factors on ARL 
Prior researchers who have studied ARL have measured company size in terms of total assets 
(Ashton et al., 1989; Courtis, 1976) while others have used revenue (Knechel Robert & Payne, 
2001). This study will separately use both measurements and give a comparative outlook on 
their effect on the ARL. Based on prior research company size could either be positively or 





association between company size and ARL this may be attributed to the fact that large 
companies may have stronger internal control systems, which reduce the likelihood of financial 
reporting errors occurring. Additionally, large companies have the capability of exerting 
greater time pressures to complete the audit in a timely fashion as compared to small companies 
(Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991). 
Profitability has been employed in prior studies on audit delay as a measure of a company’s 
financial performance (Ahmad & Kamarudin, 2003; El-Banany, 2006). Profitability has been 
defined as the rate of return of the company’s investment (Arshad & Gondal, 2013). Return on 
Equity (ROE) have been used to measure profitability (Che-Ahmad & Abidin, 2009). 
Studies show that auditors are likely to perform their audit task more cautiously and thoroughly 
for companies with low profitability due to the high business risk involved in comparison to 
companies with high profitability (Che-Ahmad & Abidin, 2009). Therefore, the audit lag is 
expected to be longer for companies with low profitability in comparison to those with high 
profitability. In Libya and Malaysia it was found that profitability doesn’t have a significant 
effect on audit lag  (Apadore & Mohd Noor, 2013; Eghliaow, 2013).  
Complexity has been identified as the level of diversification of a company’s’ business 
operations and is measured by the number of subsidiaries owned by a company (Che-Ahmad 
& Abidin, 2009). Auditors are expected to take longer to complete his audit task for companies 
with more business operations than those with few (Che-Ahmad & Abidin, 2009). Complexity 
can also be measured using the ratio of inventory and receivables to total assets. It is expected 
that a larger proportion of receivables and inventory requires more time to verify balances in 
the financial statements and hence a longer lag (Che-Ahmad & Abidin, 2009). This study will 
also employ the use ratio of inventory and receivables to total assets (Agus et al., 2015). 
Prior studies show that audit firms that decide to focus on particular industries invest in 
technologies, physical facilities, personnel, and organizational control systems which are 
expected to improve audit quality thus improving of timely financial reporting (Balsam, 
Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; Kwon, Lim, & Tan, 2007). Industry-specific auditors tend to develop 
industry specific knowledge, and are consequently expected to complete an audit within a 
shorter period than non-industry specific auditors. Other studies show that  companies in the 
financial sector for instance, banks tend to have shorter audit delays than companies in non-
financial sector because it is a highly regulated sector (Henderson & Kaplan, 2000). This study 





Ceteris paribus, it is expected that all companies would disclose financial information as fast 
as possible to avoid adverse selection (Grossman, 1981). Favorable news is usually expected 
to be reported earlier than unfavorable news (Milgrorn, 1981). There may also be an agent’s 
compensation effect in that favorable news is more likely to be rewarded. Verrecchia (1983 / 
1990) found that the incentive to disclose information is a decreasing function of the 
proprietary costs attached to a disclosure and an increasing function of the favorableness of the 
news in a disclosure. Darrough and Stoughton (1990) posited that industry dynamics may also 
influence the release of information, companies that have less fear of potential entrants will 
respond to market demands for timely information. Companies that hold favorable news might 
wish to delay disclosure, while companies with unfavorable news might want to release early 
to prevent entry (Palepu & Healy, 2001). 
According to Ettredge et al., (2011) compliance is negatively associated with bad news. Prior 
research suggests that management has incentives to exercise discretion over the timeliness of 
reporting(Chambers & Penman, 1984; Givoly & Palmon, 1982; Patell & Wolfson, 1982 ). 
Komen (2014) identified bad news to be profit warning. According to Alves et al., (2011) profit 
warning helps reduce the expectation gap and lowers market reactions to avoid large stock 
price fluctuations. Profit warning is viewed by some investors as bad news but on the other 
hand it helps reduce large stock price variations hence, perceived as good news by other 
investors (Alves et al., 2011). Disclosure of profit warning also seeks to reduce information 
asymmetry and keeping transparency (Tumurkhuu & Wang, 2010).This prevents insiders, 
mainly managers, from misusing information thereby protecting unsuspecting investors. 
Investor make decisions based on information perceived to be credible, if a firm gives 
misleading information about future prospects of the firm especially that which is related to 
profit, then investors have difficulty in relying on this information to make rational decisions 
(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2009). According to Bulkley and Herrerias (2004) profit warning is 
classified into two categories : quantitative and qualitative profit warnings. Quantitative profit 
warnings involve giving the actual figures of the profit estimates that are not met while 
qualitative profit warnings involve the use of phrases such as “unlikely to meet desired profit 
target”. 
Market participants particularly the investors do not like to receive bad news especially one 
that is related to profits. Prior studies have revealed that profit warnings are received as bad 





comparable foreign non-announcing firms (Alves et al., 2011). The norm is that profit warnings 
are communicated just before the year end and this may affect the ARL because, on average , 
managers tend to delay bad news (Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009). In Kenya it is a regulatory 
requirement for listed companies to disclose all material information and make public the 
announcement of any profit warning where there is a material discrepancy between projected 
earnings for current year and level of earnings in previous financial year (GoK, 2002). 
Companies such as National Bank of Kenya and Centum Investment have been penalized for 
violation of this requirement (Herbling, 2016a; Ngigi, 2013).  
Managerial ownership serves to align the interests of shareholders and managers (Kelton & 
Yang, 2008) and reconciles any agency conflicts between managers and shareholders thus 
reducing principle-agent conflicts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).Studies find that companies with 
high level of manager ownership have longer ARLs which is attributed to less pressure to 
release timely information since they have access to the information (Ashton et al., 1989; 
Bamber et al., 1993). In line with the body of this research this study will classify the listed 
companies as either owner controlled or manager controlled as was the case in previous studies 
(Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991). A company will be considered owner controlled if thirty percent of 
ordinary shared is owned by one individual and vice versa. Ownership concentration is treated 
as a dummy variable where 1 represents owner controlled companies (Carslaw & Kaplan, 
1991). 
Studies show that companies with high leverage have longer audit lags this is due to the like 
hood of bankruptcy (Che-Ahmad & Abidin, 2009). The amount of long term debt is also likely 
to raise agency costs and is likely to increase audit efforts because of the high business risk 
(Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; Che-Ahmad & Abidin, 2009). Prior studies have measured leverage 
as total liabilities divided by total assets (da Silveira Di Miceli, Leal, Barros, & Carvalhal-da-
Silva, 2009). A high leverage level may indicate poor financial health and the auditors may 
raise concerns that the financial reporting process is flawed (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991). He or 
she may decide to take up additional procedures that would tend to increase the audit delay 
because the audit of debt is more complicated than that of equity (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991). 
Leverage will be used as a control variable for this study.  
Prior studies posit that timely reporting of financial information is important to stakeholders 
because it is the only means of obtaining information on the company’s performance (Leventis 





information to take advantage of those without information, therefore investors will tend to 
invest in companies with shorter ARLs because they reduce information asymmetry (Ahearne, 
Griever, & Warnock, 2004; Portes & Rey, 2005). Therefore, companies with a significant 
amount of foreign ownership have an incentive to timely release audit reports. The discussion 
led to the following hypothesis. 
H2: Company-specific factors are negatively associated with ARL (size, profitability, 
complexity, industry sector, profit warning, ownership concentration, leverage, foreign 
ownership). 
2.3.2.3 Influence of corporate governance-related factors on ARL 
This section discusses prior literature on corporate governance related factors that affect the 
ARL that is, corporate governance quality and audit committee quality. Corporate governance 
is an important determinant of the ARL, it involves mechanisms that govern actions of and 
interactions between firm managers, shareholders, board members and stakeholders in an 
attempt to address principal agent conflicts (Afify, 2009 ; Hugill & Siegel, 2014). Investors are 
willing to offer valuable financing or pay higher equity price for firms with better governance 
(Chen, Chen, & Wei, 2009) because high quality corporate governance controls the principal-
agent conflict through regulation or firm policy thus protecting investors (Hugill & Siegel, 
2014). On the other hand Ettredge et al. (2011) found that non-compliant firms have lower 
quality corporate governance . 
The 20th Century has seen the emergence of new standards, principles and recommendations 
that increasingly regulate corporate governance practices (Zitouni, 2016) . Kenya has not been 
left behind as it has the Code of Corporate Practices for Issuers of Securities for the Public, 
2015. Since the publication of the Cadbury’s report in 1992, regular publication of codes of 
good conduct have enriched corporate governance quality all over the world. Prior research by 
Charreaux (1997) shows that in France, the traditional corporate governance model is focused 
on the manager who had absolute power; hence the disciplinary impact of market mechanisms 
remained limited. This led to different working committee to make recommendations for 
French companies wishing to strengthen their good governance practices. They issued the 
Viénot I and Viénot II reports, the Bouton report and The Corporate Governance Principles for 
listed companies. 
The report Viénot I named after the CEO of Société Générale , highlights the importance of 





on the dual functions of chairman and CEO, the executive compensation and shareholders right 
to access information. The Bouton report focused on the corporate governance practices in the 
composition of the board and independence of auditors and the accounting practices within the 
company. The consolidation of joint reports from AFEP and MEDEF gave rise to corporate 
governance principles which highlight ‘competence’ as an important quality of the director 
more so than ‘independence’. In 2008 these principles were updated with recommendations on 
the compensation of directors and in 2010 they were updated on the presence of women in the 
Board of Directors. 
 
The German system of governance is based on internal control mechanisms (Emmons & 
Schmid, 1998). In this system the disciplinary power of the financial markets is particularly 
restricted as opposed to the Anglo-American system characterized by more liquid markets and 
more active institutional shareholders (Elmeskov, 1995; Easton & Walker, 1997). This internal 
monitoring system is characterized by the power of banks and the formal separation between 
management and regulatory bodies (Zitouni, 2016). The ‘German code of corporate 
governance was first published in 2000 and subsequently revised ten times between the period 
of 2002 and 2015. Similarly, in 2002 the ‘Swiss code of corporate governance for public 
companies was published and revised on 2008 and 2014. In 1994 Canadians introduced the 
“guidelines for better corporate governance in Canada” which mainly emphasized on  the role 
of Directors. It was later modified into “Guide to good disclosure; corporate governance” 
which was revised in 2006 and 2013. 
In the US, several reports by the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Committee (BRC, 1999) and the National Association of Corporate Directors 
Blue Ribbon Committees (NACD, 2000) were published with recommendations on how to 
improve the quality of audit committees. This led to the SEC publishing rules about the 
communication on the composition and activities of audit committees (SEC, 1999). The 
accounting fraud scandals of 2002 led to the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in addition to 
the requirements of this act the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) issued a report that required 
listed companies to have a Board of Directors with majority being independent directors. Prior 
literature on audit delay indicates that the association between corporate governance quality 
and timeliness of financial reporting is rarely investigated (Bédard & Gendron, 2010). 
Corporate governance is a central and dynamic aspect of business and its importance cannot 





weak governance structures, corruption and fraud (Ntayi, Ngoboka, & Kakooza, 2013; Osei-
Tutu, Badu, & Owusu-Manu, 2010). 
In Kenya corporate governance started making head way in 1998 in a workshop for non-
executive directors which was organized by the Private Sector Initiative for Corporate 
Governance. This led to the Capital Markets Authority publishing of Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance Practices by Public Listed Companies in Kenya of 2002. This was later revised 
into the Code of Corporate Practices for Issuers of Securities for the Public 2015. Waweru and 
Uliana (2014) found that audit quality and firm performance are the main factors that influence 
the quality of corporate governance in Kenya. Afify (2009) recommends that further studies 
should be conducted on the relationship between ARL and corporate governance quality using 
a corporate governance index. Due to the concerns raised on the quality of corporate 
governance all over the world there is need to study it in relation to ARL. 
Agency theory posits that principal-agent conflict in companies arise due to managers self-
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The board of directors is one of many mechanisms put in 
place to monitor managers on behalf of dispersed shareholders (Abd-Elsalam & El-Masry, 
2008). The Code of Corporate Governance Practices for issuers of Securities to the Public 2015 
cites the board of directors as the single most important institution in corporate governance. It 
further states that effective corporate governance requires a board of governance that is 
composed of qualified and competent members. Prior studies show that a large board has 
difficulty in communication and coordination making it a less efficient monitoring body than 
a small board (Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 2010). A large board also has higher ‘free rider 
problem’ intensity than a small board (Jensen, 1993; Naimi Mohamad-Nor, Shafie, & Wan-
Hussin, 2010). In addition, large boards create less participation, are less organized and less 
likely to quickly reach a compromise in decisions (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; 
Mak & Li, 2001). An increase in board size is related to higher incidences of fraud cases 
(Beasley & Salterio, 2001). On the other hand small boards exhibit greater in formativeness 
(Vafeas, 2005). 
Board size has been found to be positively related to earnings management in one study (Abdul-
Rahman & Mohamed-Ali, 2006) while it has been found to be negatively associated with 
earnings management in another (Bradbury, Mak, & Tan, 2006) consequently having a mixed 
effect on the ARL. The conflicting evidence warrants a study in a Kenyan perspective. In 





suggest that the size will depend on the needs of a company. For instance, in Kenya the Code 
of Corporate Governance Practices for issuers of Securities to the Public 2015 only 
recommends that listed companies should be of sufficient size whereby it shall not be too large 
to undermine interactive discussion during meetings or too small hindering the inclusion of 
experts  
The Code of Corporate Governance Practices for issuers of Securities to the Public 2015 
recommends that the board should have policies and procedures in place to ensure 
independence of its members which should be assessed annually by the board Code of 
corporate governance, 2015). Industry practice and empirical review in finance find that the 
degree of board independence is closely related to its composition (Afify, 2009). Corporate 
governance has increasingly shifted towards having more directors who are not from the 
company and with minimal shareholding in the company to increase independence (Afify, 
2009; John & Senbet, 1998). Some researcher argue that directors from outside the company 
rarely collude with company management for their own self-interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Independent directors are a tool for keeping company’s management in check and have been 
associated with more voluntary disclosure and timely financial reporting than companies with 
less independent directors (Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Patelli & Prencipe, 
2007). However, some studies show that board independence does not enhance transparency 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). This inconsistency in findings necessitates an investigation of board 
independence in the Kenyan environment. 
CEO-duality is a term used to refer to when the CEO also serves as chairman of the board. This 
implies that most of the decision making power lies with one individual barring board 
independence reducing the boards oversight capacity (Afify, 2009). Corporate governance has 
grown towards having a separation of the CEO and Chairman of the board positions to avoid 
conflicts of self-interests (Agus et al., 2015). In Kenya the Code of Corporate Governance 
Practices for issuers of Securities to the Public 2015 recommends that the positions of CEO 
and chairperson of the board should not be held by the same individual.  
The agency theory posits that CEO- duality creates a strong individual power base which could 
impair board independence and the effectiveness of its governing functions (Abd-Elsalam & 
El-Masry, 2008). A CEO with role duality is capable of selecting board member, selecting 
agendas and controlling board meetings (Kelton & Yang, 2008). Agency theory supports the 





Studies have found that CEO-duality is associated with longer audit lags (Gul & Leung, 2004). 
In line with this body of research the Cadbury Committee (1992) recommended that large 
companies separate the role of the chairman and the CEO (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007). 
Prior studies find that separation of CEO and chairman positions contributes to timely financial 
reporting (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Gul & Leung, 2004; 
Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Sarkar, Sarkar, & Sen, 2008). However, other studies find no 
evidence that CEO duality impairs timely financial reporting (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Petra, 
2007). CEO duality adversely affects internet disclosures and an unfavorable effect on earnings 
quality (Al-Arussi, Selamat, & Mohd-Hanefah, 2009). In contrast to these findings other 
researcher have found that there is no association between CEO-duality and earnings 
management (Abdul-Rahman & Mohamed-Ali, 2006; Abdullah, Mohamad-Yusof, & 
Mohamad-Nor, 2010; Bradbury et al., 2006). In conclusion, these studies have contrasting 
findings necessitating an investigation of CEO duality’s effect on the ARL in a Kenya 
perspective. 
Corporate governance quality is defined in terms of the composition of the board and its 
activities (Jayanthi Krishnan, 2005). According to a company’s corporate governance quality 
increases as additional corporate governance standards are met. The compatibility of corporate 
governance practices with global standards has become integral to corporate success. Good 
corporate governance practices have therefore become a necessary prerequisite for any 
corporation to manage effectively in the globalized market. Researchers have developed and 
improved indices to measure corporate governance quality such as Cornelius (2005) who 
developed an index that made use of five major aspects of corporate governance. These aspects 
were board composition and independence; executive and director compensation; the executive 
and non-executive board members’ ownership; the auditory processes independence and 
separability; and capital structure (Cornelius, 2005). 
Prior literature on gender diversity shows that women are likely to be involved in monitoring- 
related committees mostly the audit committees that increase transparency (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009). Furthermore, it has been found that the participation of women in boards promotes more 
effective and prompt information to investors (Baumgartner, & Schneider, 2010). Additionally, 
prior researchers have found that boardroom gender diversity is positively related to audit effort 
and may reduce the ARL (Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011) . Some studies find that boards with 





information asymmetry (Gul, Hutchinson, & Lai, 2013). However, results have not been 
conclusive whether gender diversity reduces information asymmetry by reducing ARL (Cai, 
Keasey, & Short, 2006). 
Prior studies in the US show the following existence of the committee at sixty nine percent, 
independence at fifty seven percent, competence at fifty one percent, number of meeting at 
thirty percent and its size at twenty two percent. These characteristics are expected to different 
in different countries due to the different environmental factors of companies for instance, 
concentration of ownership (Bédard & Gendron, 2010). The Code of Corporate Governance 
Practices for issuers of Securities to the Public 2015 recommends that the board of directors of 
listed companies should appoint an audit committee of not less than three independent non-
executive members. Prior studies show that audit committee size influences financial 
disclosures (Li, Pike, & Haniffa, 2008b; Persons, 2009) where large audit committee are 
expected to solve financial reporting problems at a faster rate than smaller committee due to 
the increased resources available to the committee (Naimi Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010). 
However, other studies show that there is a weak relationship between audit committee size 
and the quality of financial information disclosure (Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin, 2010). 
Studies have found audit committee characteristics to be the board size, independence, number 
of meetings and relevant expertise  (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004; Apadore & Mohd Noor, 
2013). 
Prior studies posit that independent audit committees are likely to effective if the committees 
are active. One way of describing their activeness is in terms of the number of meetings held 
(Menon & William, 1994). The Treadway Commission  (1987) also known as the National 
Committee on Fraudulent Financial Reporting states that audit committee that intend to be 
actively involved in oversight need to maintain a high level of activity. Their diligence is 
measured by the number of meeting held (Naimi Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010). In Kenya the 
Code of Corporate Governance Practices for issuers of Securities to the Public 2015 
recommends that audit committee should meet regularly. Other jurisdictions like the US 
through the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) (1999) on audit committees recommend that audit 
committee meetings should be not less than four in a year. While in the UK the number of 
meetings should be not less than three in a year in light of the fact that companies are required 





Prior studies show that the number of times audit committees meet is positively associated with 
the level of disclosure and discretionary accruals are lower (Li et al., 2008b; Xie, Davidson III, 
& Dadalt, 2003). In addition, other studies have high level of audit committee activity is 
significantly in lowering financial restatement and fraudulent financial reporting (Abbott et al., 
2004; Persons, 2009). However, other studies find no significant association between the 
number audit committee meetings and financial reporting quality. This inconsistency in 
findings has motivated this study to find out the association in a Kenyan perspective. The 
auditing environment necessitates the need for audit committee members to have a high degree 
of accounting comprehension (Naimi Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010). Possession of the relevant 
expertise enables the audit committee members to understand auditing issues and risks. Audit 
committee members have been classified as financial experts if they have had past employment 
in finance and /or accounting, requisite professional certification in accounting and /or any 
other financial oversight experience or background which result in financial prowess (Felo & 
Solieri, 2009) . 
Prior studies show having the relevant financial expertise and prior experience and knowledge 
in financial reporting and audit minimizes fraudulent financial reporting (Bédard, Chtourou, & 
Courteau, 2004; McMullen & Raghunandan, 1996) and the audit committee is likely to make 
expert judgment than those without (DeZoort & Salterio, 2001). In addition, audit committees 
with financial expertise reduce financial restatements or constrain contributing to the timely 
release of audit reports (Abbott et al., 2004; Xie et al., 2003). Other studies show that the 
appointment of audit committee members who are financial experts has a positive stock market 
reaction because the market’s expectation is that their financial prowess will be useful in their 
financial monitoring role (DeFond, Hann, & Hu, 2005). In conclusion, these studies show that 
possession of the relevant expertise is necessary for an audit committee to be in a position to 
prevent and detect financial reporting errors in a timely manner thus reducing the ARL. 
In Kenya the Code of Corporate Governance Practices for issuers of Securities to the Public 
2015 recommends that the board for listed companies should establish an audit committee of 
not less than three independent and non-executive members. Prior studies show that  large audit 
committees are more likely to uncover and resolve potential problems in the financial reporting 
process in comparison to small audit committees and may be due to the committee availing 
resources (Naimi Mohamad-Nor et al., 2010). The audit committee size has an influence in 





provide weak evidence that audit committee size is positively associated with timely financial 
reporting (Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin, 2010). In addition, other studies show that audit 
committee size is not a significant driver of effectiveness (Bédard & Gendron, 2010). Despite 
that advantage of having the capability of availing more resources a large audit committee may 
face problems of incremental costs of poor communication, inability of reaching consensus in 
a timely manner thus affecting the audit releasing period (Bédard & Gendron, 2010). 
Javed and Iqbal (2006) proposed an index that would measure corporate governance quality 
using twenty two factors. These factors were divided into three major groups the first group 
being the composition of board independence autonomy that measures the structure and 
effectiveness of the board of directors. The second being the company’s property and 
shareholders and the third is clearness, disclosure and accountability. The maximum score is 
100 (Javed and Iqbal, 2006). Shah, Butt, & Hasan (2009) suggested that corporate governance 
is a function of board composition, ownership structure and audit committee independent. They 
developed an index that gave weights to the factors based on their relative importance then 
calculated the sum of the weights (Shah et al., 2009). da Silveira Di Miceli, Leal, Barros, & 
Carvalhal-da-Silva (2009) created an index called the corporate governance practice index 
which is computed from the responses of twenty four binary and objective questions .Each 
positive answer adds one point so the final score for each firm ranges from 0 to 24 that is, worst 
to best corporate governance quality (da Silveira Di Miceli et al., 2009) 
Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick (2003) developed an index that comprised of five levels which 
included twenty four different variables related to corporate governance systems of companies. 
Companies that had scored five or less than five had stronger corporate governance 
mechanisms and companies that scored fourteen and above had weak corporate governance 
structures (Gompers et al., 2003). For the purpose of this study the researcher adopted an index 
developed by  Zitouni (2016). He used the Data Envelopment Analysis approach which 
incorporates endogenous or exogenous relations between different mechanisms and corporate 
governance mechanisms. Additionally, it has the ability to simultaneously integrate multiple 
inputs and outputs without explicitly specifying priori functional form. It also determines a 
“good practice” frontier a kind of benchmarking of firms whose combination of governance 
standards. Units that operate efficiently have a score equal to one while less efficient have a 





Audit committee quality is defined in terms of the composition of the board and its activities 
(Jayanthi Krishnan, 2005). The audit committee plays a vital role in not only monitoring of 
internal controls to ensure the quality of financial reporting is not compromised, also but acts 
as corporate governance mechanism (Carcello & Neal, 2000; Klein, 2002). The corporate 
governance aspect of the audit committee comes about because of the potential litigation risk 
and reputation impairment (Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2007).Prior studies show that the audit 
committee quality is associated with financial reporting outcomes that is timely release of audit 
report is associated with high quality audit committees (Carcello & Neal, 2000; Klein, 2002). 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), (1999) recommended that audit committees should have 
at least one member with professional qualifications; this is because they can perform their role 
in financial reporting more effectively (Raghunandan, Read, & Rama, 2001). Kenya has 
adopted the Code of Corporate Governance Practices for issuers of Securities to the Public 
2015 recommends that audit committee should have not less than three independent and non-
executive directors and have at least one director with a professional qualification in audit or 
accounting. The discussions led to the following hypothesis.  
H3: Corporate governance related factors have a positive effect on ARL (CGQS and ACQS). 
2.3.2.4 Stakeholder perceptions on ARL and its determinants 
It is paramount to understand the perceptions of auditors regarding ARL because any difference 
that may arise may contribute to a longer or shorter ARL. Prior studies indicate that auditor 
perceive the completion of an audit in good time as a significant contributor to audit efficiency 
(Carcello, Hermanson, & McGrath, 1992). Auditors perceive that a lengthy interaction between 
them and their clients implies high audit risk to their integrity, internal and the financial 
reporting process (Mande & Son, 2011). Prior studies have found that auditor resignations 
occur in the year following lengthy ARL (Mande & Son, 2011). Longer audit delays usually 
occur due to disagreements between the auditor and client on accounting issues and general 
deterioration in the quality of auditor- client interaction. Audit delays may also be caused by 
problems in the audit, a client firm has high inherent and control risk requiring more work by 
the auditor (Ireland, 2003). Big four audit firms are more likely than non-big four audit firms 
to provide better monitoring of financial reporting process but a change in audit firm would 
reduce the audit quality and increase the likelihood of audit delays (Cassell, Giroux, Myers, & 





Prior studies indicate that auditors take actions to mitigate their risk exposure when managing 
their clients ‘portfolios. Clients in financial distress are more likely to be dropped by big four 
audit firms in comparison to those not experiencing financial distress (Schwartz & Menon, 
1985). Jones and Raghunandan (1998) also found that clients portfolio in the big 6 audit firms 
comprised less of financially distressed companies during a period of increased litigation. 
Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) argued that litigation risk proxied by Stice's (1991) litigation 
score is positively associated with auditor resignations. Johnstone & Bedard (2004) posit that, 
financial distress, audit risk factors relating to managements’ integrity, internal controls, and 
financial reporting quality have a great impact on an auditors’ decision to retain or dismiss 
clients.  
The agency theory is an important tool in managing conflicts between managers and auditors 
long ARL portrays a negative image of managers to the shareholders therefore managers 
perceive that shorter ARL means good news to shareholders which could result in rewards 
(Matos, 2001). From a managers perspective factors that may contribute to long ARL are weak 
internal controls , lack of funds to seek Big 4 auditors and the incentive to delay “bad news” 
(Kothari et al., 2009). From an investors’ perspective, a lengthy audit delay could suggest there 
has been a deterioration in the quality of client-auditor interaction which could translate into 
an auditor change, and a negative stock market reaction (Krishnamurthy et al., 2006). 
2.4 Summary of literature 
The chapter began by discussing the extant theories underpinning this study. The agency 
signaling and stakeholder theories and informed the selection of the auditor, company specific 
and corporate governance characteristics as drivers of ARL. These theories provided a 
framework in which these variables could be associated and examined. Empirical literature 
review revealed that the auditor related characteristics were audit fees, auditor type and audit 
risk. The company specific characteristics were size of the company, profitability, complexity, 
industry sector, profit warnings, ownership concentration, leverage and foreign ownership. The 
corporate governance characteristics were board and audit committee characteristics. A review 
of literature revealed that the examination of drivers of ARL was still an area of interest. The 
variables of interest were then operationalized through a review of literature. The theoretical 
and empirical review of literature revealed that drivers of ARL were an area suitable for further 
research based on unique institutional and country characteristics. The chapter concluded with 





2.5 Research Gap 
While these studies on audit delay share many similarities, they also present peculiarities that 
differentiate them. Prior studies show differences in respect of periods, methodology, variables 
introduced and conclusions obtained. In this research the inevitable gap existing between the 
close of the accounting period and the date of signing of the audit report is analyzed, taking the 
view that minimizing this gap would improve the efficiency of the market (Leventis et al., 
2005). A review of literature has established that most studies on ARL have focused on the 
components of corporate governance and less on the quality of corporate governance. 
Moreover, studies have also focused on profitability of companies and few on profit warning. 
It has also revealed that different countries have different institutional set-ups. 
2.6 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework is described as an elaborate network of associations between the 
dependent independent and confounding variables considered as relevant to the problem being 
addressed by the study (Kothari, 2009). The dependent variable is the variable of primary 
interest (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). The confounding variable is the variable that obscures the 
effects of another variable or one that correlates with the independent and dependent variables 






Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework 
2.7 Operationalization of variables  
This section describes how the researcher measured the independent variables that is; auditor 
related factors, Company related factors corporate governance factors. The dependent variable 
was ARL. It also identifies the control variables used in the study. Hassan (2016) investigated 
the determinants of ARL in Palestine using annual reports for the year ending 2011. The study 
measured ARL as the number of days from the financial year end to the audit report date. The 
study conducted a multiple regression to identify the company characteristics, ownership 
structure and corporate governance mechanisms. The study found that board size, corporate 
size, status of the audit firm, company complexity, existence of audit committee and ownership 
dispersion influenced ARL. This study treated ARL as  the dependent variable because it was 
the dependent variable against the auditor-, company-, corporate governance-related 
characteristics.  
The independent variables for the study were audit fees, auditor type, and audit risk (auditor-
related). Company size, profitability, industry sector, profit warning, ownership concentration 





Corporate governance-related. Baatwah et al. (2015) investigated the CEO characteristics and 
audit report timeliness. The study utilized the amount paid to external auditors for an audit 
engagement. The audit fees were transformed into natural logarithm. Mohamad-Nor, Shafie 
and Wan-Hussin (2010)  investigated Corporate governance and audit report lag in Malaysia 
following the implementation of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 2001. The 
study treated auditor type as a dummy variable where if an audit firm was among the Big 4 
audit firms 1 was scored and 0 if it was not among the Big 4. Consistent with the study, this 
study also treated auditor type as a dummy variable. 
Sultana et al. (2015) examined the audit committee characteristics and the ARL. The study 
estimated audit risk as the ratio of current liabilities to current assets. Consistent with the study 
this study measured audit risk as the ratio of current liabilities to current assets. Baatwah et al. 
(2015) examined CEO characteristics and audit report timeliness using data from the Oman 
capital market for a five year period from 2007-2011. The study measured company size using 
the log of total assets. Similar to the study, this study utilized the log of total assets to measure 
company size.  
Apadore and Mohd Noor (2013) analyzed the relation between the characteristics of corporate 
governance; board independence, ownership concentration, audit committee independence, 
expertise, meeting, size, internal audit investment and audit report lag among companies listed 
under Bursa Malaysia 2009 to 2010. The study estimated ROA as net income to total assets 
ratio. Similarly, this study measured ROA as the profit after tax to total assets ratio. 
Additionally, Puat Nelson and Norwahida Shukeri (2011) examined the impact of corporate 
governance characteristics on ARL in Malaysia. The study treated firm performance as a 
dummy variable where 1 was scored if company made profits and 0 otherwise. Similarly, this 
study employed the dummy variable measure used by to measure firm performance. 
Henderson and Kaplan (2000) investigated the determinants of ARL in the banking sector. The 
study treated industry sector as a dichotomous variable where 1 was scored if the company was 
in the banking sector and 0 otherwise. Similarly, this study treated the listed companies 
belonging to the different sectors as dummy variables.1 was scored if firm was in the 
agricultural sector and 0 otherwise. Similarly 1 was scored if firm was in the manufacturing 
and allied and 0 otherwise. 1 was scored if firm was in the automobiles and accessories sector 
and 0 otherwise. 1 was scored if firm was in the banking sector and 0 otherwise. 1 was scored 





sector and 0 otherwise. 1 was scored if firm was in the commercial and services sector and 0 
otherwise. 1 was scored if firm was in the construction and allied sector and 0 otherwise. 1 was 
scored if firm was in the energy and petroleum sector and 0 otherwise. 1 was scored if firm 
was in the telecommunication and technology sector and 0 otherwise (Henderson & Kaplan, 
2000). 
Soltani (2002) investigated the timeliness of corporate and audit reports in the French context 
over a ten year period. The study  treated profit warning as a dichotomous variable where 1 
was scored if company issued profit warning and 0 otherwise.as was the case in previous 
studies this study also treated profit warning as a dummy variable (Soltani, 2002). Carslaw and 
Kaplan (1991) examined audit delay in New Zealand using company (owner control and 
manager control) explanatory variables. The study estimated ownership concentration as a 
dummy variable where 1 was scored if owner or manager had 30% or more ownership and 0 
otherwise. Similarly, this study treated ownership concentration as a dummy variable. 
Mathuva, Mboya and Mcfie (2016) examined the association of the governance of credit unions 
and their social environmental disclosure in a developing country. The study utilized a 
corporate governance quality index to measure corporate governance quality and an audit 
committee quality index to measure audit committee quality. Similary, Zitouni (2016) 
developed an index that consituted governance mechanisms as  inputs and governance 
standards from the codes of good practices  as the outputs. These studies  treated  the following 
as dummy variables ; board size, independence, training of board members, board meetings, 
audit committee presence, AC size, AC meetings, relevant expertise, presence of compensation 
committee, CEO presence in compensation committee, gender diversity, presence of other 
committees, financial expertise and supervisory experiencce. 
Al-Ajmi (2008) investigated of the timeliness of annual reports of an unbalanced panel of 231 
firm-years of financial and non-financial copanies listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange. The 
study measured leverage as total liabilities divided by total assets. Similarly, this study 
employed the total liabilities to total assets ratio to estimate leverage. Baatwah et al. (2015) 
examined CEO characteristics and audit report timeliness using data from the Oman capital 
market for a five year period from 2007-2011. The study measured firm performance using 
ROA calculated as the profit after tax divided by total assets. Similarly, this study estimated 






Table 2.1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable type Measure Definition Source
ARLit ARL
No. of days from financial year end to the issuance of the audit 
report ( Hassan, 2016; Habib & Bhuiyanb, 2011).
Listed companies' annual reports
LNFEEit Audit fees The natural log of audit fees (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2012). Listed companies' annual reports
AUDITORTYPEit Auditor type
Treated as dichotomous variable where 1 was scored if audit 
firm was Big-4 and 0 otherwise (Che-Ahmad & Abidin, 2009). 
Listed companies' annual reports
AUDITRISKit Audit risk
Prior studies measure audit risk as the ratio of current liabilities 
to current assets (Sultana, Singh, & Mitchell Van der Zahn, 
2015).
Listed companies' annual reports
LNTAit Size The natural log of total assets (Baatwah et al., 2015). Listed companies' annual reports
PROFITABILITYit Profitability
This was treated as a dummy variable where 1 if company 
makes profit and 0 if it makes loss.
Listed companies' annual reports
COMPLEXITYit Complexity
Ratio of inventory and receivables to total assets (Che-Ahmad & 
Abidin, 2009). 
Listed companies' annual reports
ISit Industry sector
This was treated as a dummy variable where 1 is scored if 
company is in the agricultural, Automobiles and accessories, 
Banking, Commercial and services, Construction and allied, 
Insurance, Manufacturing and allied, Telecommunication and 
technology and 0 otherwise (Eghliaow, 2013).
Listed companies' annual reports
PWARNINGit Profit warning
This was treated as dummy variable where1 is scored if there 
was a profit warning and 0 otherwise (Soltani, 2002).




A binary variable variable where 1 is scored if company has 
individuals owning more than 30% of the total shares and 0 
otherwise (Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991; Mohamad-Nor et al., 
2010).
Listed companies' annual reports
LEVERAGEit Leverage
Total liabilities to total assets (da Silveira Di Miceli, Leal, 
Barros, & Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2009)
Listed companies' annual reports




This was measured by the corporate governance quality index as 
in Appendix V.
The code of corporate practices for issuers of 
securities for the public 2015,  Mathuva, 




This was measured by the audit committee quality index as in 
Appendix VI.
The code of corporate practices for issuers of 
securities for the public 2015,  Mathuva, 











CHAPTER THREE  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology for collecting and analyzing the data for testing the 
objectives of the study. It discussed the research design, research philosophy, population and 
data collection techniques to be used.  It began with a rationale for the broad research 
philosophy underpinning the quantitative and qualitative approach taken by this study. It 
discussed the primary and secondary data collection methods to be used and the methods used 
to analyze data from both sources. This chapter also discussed the regression model to be used 
in analyzing secondary data. 
3.2 Research Philosophy  
Various authors have argued on different research ideologies known as paradigm argument 
that have shaped knowledge development over the years (Alzheimer Europe, 2009).This 
research employed an ontological research philosophy paradigm which relates more to the 
dynamics of human beings (Agyeman, 2010). A positivistic research is one that deals with 
units that can be observed and tested (Agyeman, 2010; Remenyi, Williams, Money, & Swartz, 
1998) stated “a positivist approach to research implies that the researcher is working with an 
observable social reality, for which the end product of such reality should be the derivation of 
laws or law like generalizations”. 
Consistent with prior studies (Eghliaow, 2013) on audit delay in Libya, this study was guided 
by the post positivism philosophical approach with the premise that the social reality exists 
“out there” and can be scientifically measured. A nomothetic will be applied which enables the 
researcher to apply statistical techniques to test hypotheses and analyze research data collated 
using quantitative research techniques, such as questionnaire (Castro-Schilo & Ferrer, 2013). 
Post positivism philosophical assumptions include causality determinism where cause 
determines effect and reductionism where ideas are reduced and theories verified using 
empirical methods (Creswell, 2003) . 
3.3 Research Design 
The development of a good research design permits us to obtain the best data possible 
(Creswell, 2012). This study employed a descriptive research design because the study 





researcher to identify the status of the phenomena that is ARL and explain its determinants. 
This study analyzed the relationship between auditor-related factors, corporate governance-
related factors, company-specific factors and ARL. 
3.4 Population and sample 
A population is the entire group of individuals, events or objects having a common observable 
characteristic (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). For the purpose of this study the target 
population was all publicly listed companies in the NSE. Data was obtained from the annual 
reports of all listed companies for the period 2006-2015 as this were the more recent reports 
available as at the time of the study. Table 3.1 presents the companies targeted after removal 
of delisted companies, those listed after 2010 and those suspended from trading during the 
study period. Table 3.2 presents the sectoral distribution of listed companies in the study. 
Table 3.1: Companies in the final sample 




Total companies listed as of 31 December 2016 66 660 
Less:  Number of delisted companies 2 20 
           Number of companies listed after 2010 11 110 
           Number of companies suspended from  trading 9 90 
Total number of companies in the final sample 44 440 
 





Table 3.2: Sectoral distribution of listed companies in the study 
 
Source: NSE list of listed companies by industry as of 31st December 2016 
3.5 Data collection 
The study used both primary and secondary data. Secondary data was sourced from annual 
reports and keyed into an excel sheet with the variables being studied. A semi-structured 
questionnaire was used to collect primary data and corroborate findings of data obtained from 
the annual reports. The interview questionnaire targeted internal auditors of the 44 listed 
companies and their external auditors.  
Secondary data were collected from the regulator, that is, the Capital Markets Authority, the 
NSE handbook and the various company websites. Primary data was used to corroborate 
secondary data to be collected. The semi-structured questionnaires (Appendix II) aided in 
obtaining information from the practitioners. The corporate governance quality index as 
presented in Appendix IV captured the aspects of corporate governance. Finally, the audit 
committee quality index captured aspects of audit committee (Appendix V). 
Industry No. of companies Percentage % # of observations




Investment 2 6 20







Banking 10 17 100


















3.6 Data Analysis and presentation 
Data analysis has been defined the systematic application of statistical tools to process data 
into meaningful information (Saunders et al., 2009). Data was collected from the semi-
questionnaires and annual reports it was cleaned, coded and classified in preparation of further 
analysis using regression models. To test the first objective the researcher employed a panel 
regression approach; this is because the study was looking at the cross sectional and time series 
nature of the data. Pooled regression model was not used because it would have denied the 
different companies heterogeneity or individuality since it assumes that all the companies are 
similar (Brooks, 2012; Wooldridge, 2015). 
The researcher used the Hausman test to check whether to use Random or fixed effects models. 
The first model was regressed using fixed effects panel because the Hausman’s Chi2 was 
significant with a p-value of 0.066 (p<0.1). The second and third model was regressed using 
random effects because the Hausman’s Chi2 were statistically insignificant (p<0.1) p-values 
were 0.655, 0.371 respectively. Finally, the fourth model was regressed using was regressed 
using fixed effects model since the Hausman’s Chi2 was statistically significant (p< 0.05). To 
establish the significant determinants of ARL, the following regression model was utilized: 










Where: AUD_FACTORS represents audit fees, auditor type and audit risk. COMPANY_CHAR 
represents firm size, profitability, complexity, industry sector, profit warning, ownership 
concentration, leverage and foreign ownership. CORPORATE_GOV represents corporate 
governance quality score and audit committee quality score. 𝛾𝑖𝑡 and ∅𝑖𝑡 are industry and firm 
year controls. Finally, ε is the error term associated with the regression.  
The study employed a two stage panel least squares regression model and therefore tests were 
conducted to check for any violations of the assumptions of linear regression. Test for 
normality was conducted using the skewness and kurtosis test. If the data was not normal the 
researcher would use regression standardized residual, p-p and q-q plots to check for normality. 
Multicolinearity was tested using correlation matrix and VIF in the event that there was 





would be tested using Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test if the source of the heteroscedasticity is 
known GLS would be employed for the regression. In the event the source of the 
heteroscedasticy is not known the variables would be converted into logarithms.  
Autocorrelation would be testes using the Durbin-Watson (DW) test. In the event there was 
autocorrelation the study would use a general to specific model as done in prior studies (Mizon, 
1995).   
3.7 Research quality 
3.7.1 Internal validity 
Internal validity addresses whether or not an observed covariation should be considered a 
causal relationship (Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1982). To ensure internal validity the 
researcher conducted a pilot study before issuance of the questionnaire to the intended 
respondents. The questionnaire was issued to five MCOM students specializing in forensic 
accounting, three accounting lecturers and two external auditors. Feedback from the 
respondents led to the deletion of some questions due to their repetitiveness. 
3.7.2 External validity 
External validity addresses the concern of whether or not a causal relationship should be 
generalized (Calder et al., 1982). To ensure external validity the study ensured that majority of 
the listed companies were included in the sample as can be seen in table 3.1. 
3.8 Ethical considerations 
Ethical considerations in research is important especially when it involves human beings 
(Cooper & Schindler, 2010). Research ethics is defined as the appropriate behavior of research 
relative to norms of the society (Zikmund, 2010). Research may have adverse consequences 
and therefore research subjects have to be protected (Cooper & Schindler, 2010 ; Patton, 2002 
; Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). This research considered ethical considerations in the following 
ways. First, participation was voluntary and participants reserved the right to withdraw at any 
time. Secondly, the participants were informed of the purpose of this study using a cover letter 
approved by the university that accompanied the questionnaire. Thirdly, the cover letter assured 
the participants of total confidentiality. Finally, the identities of the participants were kept 







CHAPTER FOUR  
PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of analysis done on data derived from annual reports and 
questionnaires. Data from questionnaires were collected from internal and external auditor of 
companies listed in the Nairobi securities exchange. The section is organized into two parts. 
Part A: results from secondary data analysis. Part B: results from primary data. Part A presents 
the diagnostic tests, correlation matrix, selecting the significant determinants of ARL, final 
model using most significant variables and robustness checks. Part B presents the demographic 
characteristics, auditor and manager perspectives on the drivers of ARL. 
4.2 Results from secondary data analysis 
4.3 Diagnostics tests 
This section entails the diagnostic tests carried out prior to the multiple-regression. 
4.3.1 Test for Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity is a problem that exists if the errors do not have a constant variance, that is, 
var(ut) = σ2 < ∞ (Brooks, 2012; Wooldridge, 2015). Consistent with prior studies the Lagrange 
Multiplier was used to check for heteroscedasticity (Yaacob & Che-Ahmad, 2012). The 
Lagrange Multiplier is calculated by using R2 from the auxiliary regression and multiplying it 
by the number of observations, that is, TR2 ∼ χ2(m) where m is the number of regressors in 
the auxiliary regression  (Brooks, 2012; Wooldridge, 2015). The null hypothesis was H0=0, 
there is no heteroscedasticity. Table 4.1 shows how the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) was arrived 
at. According to these findings the calculated LM for model one was 270.297 and the 5% 
critical value from the χ2 was 7.815 which lead to the conclusion that there was 
heteroscedasticity since the researcher rejected the null hypothesis. Similarly, the calculated 
LM for model two was 69.488 and the 5% critical value from the χ 2 was 21.026 which lead to 
the conclusion that there was no heteroscedasticity since the researcher did not reject the null 
hypothesis. 
The calculated LM for model three was 5.936 and the 5% critical value from the χ2 was 5.991 
which lead to the conclusion that there was no heteroscedasticity since the researcher did not 
reject the null hypothesis. A possible solution is the use of generalized least squares (GLS) 





Another suggested solution to heteroscedasticity is converting variables into logs (Brooks, 
2012; Wooldridge, 2015). Therefore, total assets, audit fees were converted to logs. 
Table 4.1: Lagrange Multiplier 
























4.3.2 Test for Normality 
Normality tests for ARL was done using skewness and kurtosis which are the standardized 
third and fourth moments of a distribution (Brooks, 2012). A symmetric distribution should be 
zero (Gujarati & Porter, 2009) . According to Brooks (2012) the normality assumption  that the 
disturbances are normally distributed (ut ∼ N(0, σ2)) is required to conduct for one to conduct 
a regression analysis. According to Table 4.5 the skewness of ARL was 0.851, this indicated a 
slight skewness to the right. The coefficient for kurtosis related to the dependent variable ARL 
was 1.684 implying that the variable is flatly distributed. Data that have the asymptotic property 
that is, they are large enough (n>30 or 40) the violation of the normality assumption should not 
be problematic (Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012). Additionally, normality checks were conducted 
using histograms, probability-probability plots and standardized residuals (Appendix VI, VII, 
VIII and IX) which revealed that the data was near normal.   
4.3.3 Test for Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation is the problem that exists if the disturbance terms are not equal to zero that is 
cov(ui,uj) = 0 (Brooks, 2012; Wooldridge, 2015). Presence of autocorrelation could lead to 
incorrect standard errors (Brooks, 2012). Consistent with prior studies the Durbin-Watson test 
was used to check for auto-correlation (Baatwah et al., 2015; Sultana et al., 2015) . The null 
hypothesis being tested is H0=0, no autocorrelation. Table 4.12 shows that for model 1 the 
Durbin Watson statistic was 1.197 which was close to 2 Durbin Watson statistic was 1.1656 
for model 2 which was close to 2. Durbin Watson statistic was model 3 was 0.480 not close to 
two indicating that there was autocorrelation due to the rejection of the null hypothesis. In line 





problem and can be avoided by a “general to specific strategy” this study used a two-stage 
panel least squares regressions model (Mizon, 1995).  
4.3.4 Test for Multi-collinearity 
Multi-collinearity has been defined as the problem that arises when two or more independent 
variables are highly correlated (Brooks, 2012). Consistent with prior studies related to ARL 
multi-collinearity was tested using the correlation matrix (Mande & Son, 2011; Waweru et al., 
2015). Evidence from the correlation matrix shows that the highest coefficient correlation was 
at 0.687 which was less than 0.8 meaning that multi-collinearity was not a problem. Therefore, 
there was also no multi-collinearity. Additional tests were conducted using the Variance 
Inflation Factor VIF). Prior studies show that a VIF geater than five (tolerance <0.20) implies 
that the regression coefficients were poorly estimated (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013; 
Mardikyan & Çetin, 2008). Table 4.2 presents the multicollinearity test using VIF. Prior studies 
show that VIF that is less than ten implies no multi-collinearity (Dao & Pham, 2014). 
According to the findings in table 4.2 the VIF of the independent variables ranged between 
1.17 and 8.331. The tolerance values ranged between 0.12 and 0.851. Therefore both the 
tolerance values and VIF values showed that there was no multi-collinearity since they were 
below 10 (Brooks, 2012; Dao & Pham, 2014). In conclusion, since there is no relationship 














Table 4.2: Results of the Multicollinearity Check Using Tolerance and VIFs 
 
Note: To avoid the dummy variable trap the IS_Banking variable was removed (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009). 
4.3.5 Descriptive statistics  
Table 4.3 presents findings on descriptive statistics on the dependent variable ARL and 
independent variables relating to the auditor that determine ARL; these are the type of auditor 
and audit risk. These findings show that on average Kenyan listed companies have an ARL of 
87 days a few more days than companies listed in the Australian stock exchange (80.67 days) 
(Lai & Cheuk, 2005; Sultana et al., 2015). This rate is significantly higher than that of previous 
studies in other countries (Australia 57%) (Sultana et al., 2015). Table 4.3 presents a summary 
of the descriptive statistics on the company specific variables that influence ARL. According 
to Table 4.7 most of the companies were making profits (91.56%) for the period under study. 
65.26% of the listed companies for the period under study had at least one individual or entity 
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that controlled more that 30% of shares. At least 20.18% of listed companies had foreign 
ownership. The findings also show that on average Kenyan listed companies have a leverage 
level of 0.803 which shows a high level of financial risk contrary to countries like the US 
(0.218) and lower level of financial risk to countries like Australia (2.12) (Agus et al., 2015; 
Sultana et al., 2015). The descriptive statistics for the independent variables industry sector, 
profit warning and ownership concentration were not reported in detail because they were 
treated as dichotomous variable (Sultana et al., 2015).  
Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics on the items in the corporate governance quality index. 
The findings show that on average Kenyan listed companies have 9 board members, 8 board 
meetings in a year, 5 independent directors in the board, 4 audit committee members, 4 audit 
committee meetings in a year. These findings are in line with the recommendations of code of 
corporate practices for issuers of securities for the public, 2015. Training of board members, 
relevant qualification of AC members, presence of compensation committee, CEO member of 
compensation committee, presence of committees other than the board of directors, audit and 
compensation committee were treated as dichotomous variable hence descriptive statistics 
could not be used meaningfully (Sultana et al., 2015). 
Table 4.3 shows findings of descriptive statistics on the elements in the audit committee quality 
index. The findings show that on average Kenyan listed companies have four independent non-
executive directors and four meetings in a year. This is consistent with prior studies that 
indicate the average committee size exceeds three (Goodwin, 2003; Sultana et al., 2015). In 
addition these findings are also in line with the recommendations of code of corporate practices 
for issuers of securities for the public, 2015. Presence of audit committee, finance expertise 
and supervisory experience were treated as dichotomous variable hence descriptive statistics 






Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.
ARL 424 86.4 83 212 26 27.812
Audit Risk 424 1.455 0.709 3.2 -0.471 28.676
Auditor type 424 0.868 1 1 0 0.339
Audit fees 424 9284 7339 7510 223 39194
Categorical variables 
IS_AGRIC 424 0.097 0 1 0 0.296
IS_AUTOACCESSO 424 0.05 0 1 0 0.217
IS_BANKING 424 0.231 0 1 0 0.422
IS_COMMSERV 424 0.144 0 1 0 0.351
IS_CONSTRUCTION 424 0.122 0 1 0 0.327
IS_ENERGYPETR 424 0.074 0 1 0 0.263
IS_INSURANCE 424 0.084 0 1 0 0.278
IS_INVESTMENT 424 0.05 0 1 0 0.217
IS_MAN 424 0.124 0 1 0 0.33
IS_TELECOM 424 0.025 0 1 0 0.156
OWNCONC 424 0.653 1 1 0 0.477
PROFITABILITY 424 0.916 1 1 0 0.278
PWARNING 424 0.077 0 1 0 0.267
Continuous variables 
LEVERAGE 424 0.803 0.583 87.213 0 4.325
LNAUDITFEE 424 8.796 8.91 10.576 5.407 0.932
LNTA 424 16.558 16.57 20.14 8.749 1.831
COMPLEXITY 424 0.175 0.076 1.7 0 0.388
FOROWN 424 0.176 0.014 0.997 0 0.247
ROA 424 0.066 0.045 0.538 -0.299 0.087
Size of board of directors 424 8.762 9 2.387 3 16
Number of  board meetings in 
a year 
424 7.616 7 2.123 1 13
Number of independent 
directors
424 4.455 4 2.39 0 12
Size of audit committee 424 3.366 3 1.069 0 7
Number of audit committee 
meetings per year
424 4.066 4 1.681 0 14
Number of independent non-
executive directors
424 3.306 3 1.154 0 7
Size of AC board 424 3.366 3 1.069 0 7
Number of meetings in a year 424 4.066 4 1.681 0 14








4.4 Correlation matrix 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient is a parametric rank statistic that measures the strength of a 
relationship between two variables (Piovani, 2008). The correlation matrix shows the highest 
coefficient correlation was 0.681 which was less than 0.8 meaning that multi-collinearity was 
not a problem. The variable profit warning had a positive relation with ARL however; it was 
not significant implying that it may not be related to ARL. Table 4.4 presents a summary of 
the Pearson’s correlation matrix. The full matrix can be availed on request. 
The findings show that the correlation coefficients between ARL and auditor type was weak, 
negative and significant (coefficient = -0.348, p = 0.000). This implies that there is some 
relationship between audit fee and ARL. The correlation coefficient for audit fee was weak, 
negative and p-value was significant (coefficient= -0.210, p-value = 0.000). The correlation 
coefficient for total assets was weak, negative and p-value was significant (coefficient=-0.272, 
p-value= 0.000). This implied that companies with large asset had shorter ARL. The correlation 
coefficient for profitability was weak, negative and p-value was significant (coefficient= -
0.183, p-value=0.000). This meant that companies that were profitable had shorter ARL. The 
correlation coefficient for FOROWN was weak, negative and p-value was significant 
(coefficient=-0.112, p-value=0.021). The correlation coefficient for leverage was weak, 
negative and p-value was significant (coefficient= -0.160, p-value=0.000). The correlation 





















































































.046 .027 -.005 .066 -.190
** .012 -.033 -.012 .030 1
FOROWN -.112
* -.002 -.105
* .078 -.001 -.038 .240
























**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).





4.5 Selecting the significant determinants of ARL 
This study used panel regression method to select the determinants of ARL. Consistent with 
prior studies this study used panel regression to identify the significant determinants of ARL 
(Henderson & Kaplan, 2000; Yaacob & Che-Ahmad, 2012). Table 4.5 shows a summary of 
the regression statistics for models 1, 2 and 3. According to the findings all the models were 
significant since the F-statistic was significant (p<0.05). The most significant auditor related 
variable influencing ARL is Auditor type that has a p-value of 0.003. The most significant 
company specific variables are total assets, profitability, ROA, IS-Banking, IS-Investment, IS-
Manufacturing. Table 4.5 also shows that the corporate governance quality score is significant 
(P<0.1). The study used panel data and therefore, it was necessary to carry out the Hausman 
test. The Hausman test is used to determine whether to use a fixed or random effects model to 
run the regression (Brooks, 2012). The study used model 1 to represent the auditor-related 
characteristics (objective 1), model 2 to represent company specific characteristics (objective 
2) and model 3 to represent the corporate governance characteristics (objective 3). Therefore, 
the Hausman test was conducted for models 1, 2 and 3 to determine whether to use random 
effects or fixed effects model. The null hypothesis was the random effects model was sufficient. 
For Model 1 the Hausman chi2 (χ 2) (p-value=0.066) was significant, hence the null hypothesis 
was rejected and the fixed effect model was selected. Model 2 the Hausman chi2(χ 2) p-value 
(0.655) was not significant level hence the null hypothesis was not rejected; hence the random 
effects model was selected. Model 3 the Hausman chi2 (χ 2) (p-value=0.371) was not significant 
hence the null hypothesis was not rejected; hence the random effects model was selected.  
 
Table 4.5 reveals that Model 1 had an adjusted R-squared of 58.5% indicating that the 58.5% 
of the variability of the dependent variable (ARL) was explained by the independent variables 
and 41.5% was explained by variables not in the model.  Model 2 had an R-squared of 17.2% 
implying that 17.2% of the variability in ARL was explained by the independent variables and 
82.8% was explained by variables not in the model. Model 3 R-squared of 1.4% indicating that 
only 1.4% of the variability in ARL was explained by the independent variables and 98.6% 
was explained by variables not in the model. According to the findings in table 4.5 the most 
significant variables were auditor type (t=-3.028, p-value=0.003). LNTA (t=-1.651, p-
value=0.099). PROFITABILITY (t=-1.790, p-value=0.074). ROA (t=-4.282, p-value=0.000). 
DIV (t=-2.424, p-value=0.016), IS-BANKING (t=-2.028, p-value=0.043), IS-INVEST (t=-





value=0.092). These variables were then regressed together against ARL and the results 
presented in table 4.6. 
Table 4.5: Regression results 
Note: Values are in brackets are the t-statistics 
 Variables Coefficient p-value Std. Error p-value Std. Error Coefficient p-value Std. Error





























Model used Fixed Effects
Observations 423

























































AUDIT RISK 0.676 0.532





Dependent variable : ARL






4.6 Final model using the most significant variables  
The final model was arrived at by selecting the most significant variables from the auditor 
related variables company specific variables and corporate governance variables. Table 4.6 
presents summary statistics of the regression using the most significant variables identified in 
model 1, 2 and 3. The overall model was significant since the F-statistic was significant 
(p<0.05). The Hausman test was conducted and found that the chi square statistic of 10.022 
had a p-value of 0.348 which means that it was not significant (p > 0.1). The null hypothesis 
tested was random effect model is appropriate, with a p-value of 0.348 was not significant 
(p<0.05) we failed to reject it. Therefore, these variables were regressed using the random 
effects model and the output is presented in table 4.6. The regression revealed that the most 
significant variables were auditor type (t=-5.24, p-value=0.000) return on assets (t=-5.786, p-
value=0.000), IS-Banking (t=-6.253, p-value=0.000), IS-Investment (t=3.94, p-value=0.000), 
IS-manufacturing (t=-4.66, p-value=0.000). The adjusted R-squared for the model was 37.1%. 
This implies that 37.1% of the variability in ARL was explained by the independent variables 


















Table 4.6: Regression statistics most significant variables 
 
Note: Values are in brackets are the t-statistics 
*** p< 0.01 
** p< 0.05 
























































4.6.1 Robustness check using Fixed Effects  
This study further conducted a robustness check on the final model using the fixed effects 
model and the output was presented in table 4.7. According to the findings the overall model 
was significant since the F-statistic was significant (p<0.05). The findings reveal that the most 
significant variables were Profitability consistent with (Khasharmeh & Aljifri, 2010), Return 
on Assets (t=-5.804, p-value=0.000), IS-Banking (t=-5.924, p-value=0.000), IS-Investment 
(t=3.775, p-value=0.000). The finding on profitability was consistent with that of Khasharmeh 
and Aljifri (2010) . The fixed effects model contrasts the random effects model in that that the 
auditor type and IS-Man are not significant. However, the adjusted R-squared increased to 
37.2%. This implies that 37.2% of the variability in the ARL is can be predicted by the model 







Table 4.7: Regression statistics (fixed effects model) 
 
Note: Values are in brackets are the t-statistics 

























































4.7 Robustness check using all variables in one model 
The study also did robustness check by using one model to regress the auditor related variables, 
company-specific variables, corporate governance variable and the output was presented in 
table 4.8. The overall model was significant since the F-statistic was significant (p<0.05). 
According to the findings the most significant variables were audit fees (t=-2.762, p-
value=0.006), auditor type (t=-3.981, p-value=0.000), CGQS(t=-2.094, p-value=0.004), 
IS_banking (t=-3.374, p-value=0.001), IS_investment (t=3.368, p-value=0.001), IS_man (t=-
3.275, p-value=0.001), IS_telecom (t=-2.750, p-value=0.006), LNAUDITFEE (t=2.173, p-
value=0.030), LNTA (t=-2.100, p-value=0.040), ROA (t=-4.030, p-value=0.000). The R-
squared increased by 7.7% implying that this model could explain slightly more of the 
variability of the ARL. However, the Durbin-Watson stat was 0.800 implying there was 
autocorrelation. The previous model tends to take care of autocorrelation because it tends to 





Table 4.8: Regression statistics (all variables) 
 
Note: Values are in brackets are the t-statistics 
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, *    p< 0.10 
Variable Coefficient p-value Std. Error
112.956
(-0.459)
ACQS 8.758 0.341 9.19
(-0.953)
ASSETGROW -0.158 0.572 0.28
(-0.566)
AUDITFEES -0.001*** 0.006 0
(-2.762)
AUDITORTYPE -18.456*** 0 4.635
(-3.981)
AUDITRISK -0.252 0.496 0.37
(-0.682)
CGQS -25.163*** 0.037 12.014
(-2.094)
COMPLEXITY 0.174 0.983 0.232
(0.063
FOROWN 1.364 0.775 3.658
-3.23
LEVERAGE -0.009 0.977 9.774
(-2.750)
LNAUDITFEE 8.118** 0.03 0.308
(-0.030)
LNTA -4.290** 0.037 3.736
-2.173
OWNCONC 1.605 0.576 2.044
(-2.099)
PROFITABILITY -6.42 0.206 2.87
(-0.559)
PWARNING 0.4 0.928 5.072
-1.266


















4.9 Results from questionnaire  
4.9.1 Demographic characteristics 
Results from the questionnaire show that most of the respondents were male, that is, 74.42% 
N=32 while 25.58% N=11 were female. These findings show that women are under-
represented in both audit firms and listed companies this is consistent with findings from 
Anderson-Gough, Grey, & Robson (2005) who found that organizations have processes to 
ensure gender domination. The results of the respondents’ main occupation show majority of 
the respondents were external auditors at 56.8%, N=25, then internal auditors at 38.6%, N=17, 
then those from other professions like forensic accounting and management consultants were 
6.80 % and finally those from who were accountants were represented by 2.3% N=1. Generally, 
these results show that majority of the respondents were from the targeted respondents of 
practitioners in the Kenyan listed firms audit firms of these listed firms. The results of the 
respondents length of experience is shown in figure 4.3 below. The results show that majority 
of the respondents had between 1 to 4 years of experience in their current occupations 
represented by 30.95%,N=13 followed by those who had between 5 to 10 years of experience 
at 38.10% N=6. Additionally, the findings show that those with between 11 to 15 years of 
experience were represented by 9.52% N=4, those with over 15 years of experience were 
14.29% N=6. Finally, those with less than a year of experience were represented by 7.14% 
N=3. All in all, these findings show that majority of the respondents had the necessary years 
of experience to comprehend the questions in the questionnaire. The findings revealed that 
majority of the respondents had CPA as a professional qualifications represented by 93.75%. 
In addition to CPA the respondent had CIA and CISA each represented by 6.25% N=2. Finally, 
those who had CPA had ACCA, CIFA, CPS and Indian CA each represented by 3.13% N=1. 
In conclusion, these findings show that the respondents had the necessary knowledge to 
comprehend the questions in the questionnaire. 
4.9.2 Practitioners’ perspectives on the determinants of ARL 
The study used factor analysis to analyze the practitioners’ on the drivers of ARL (objective 
4). Factor analysis was selected because it attempts to bring together inter-correlated variables 
under a more general, underlying variable (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Field, 2009). Table 4.9 
reports the variance explained by from the initial solution and the extracted components. The 
total column presents the amount of variance in the original variances accounted for by each 
component. The percentage of variance column presents the ratio of the variance accounted for 





column presents that percentage of variance accounted for by the first n components (Costello 
& Osborne, 2005; Field, 2009). Findings from the initial solution indicate that there are as 
many components as variables. According to the findings from table 4.9, factor 1 to 5 explained 
approximately 52.161% variability in the original forty five variables respectively.  
 
Table 4.9: Results of factor analysis: Total Variance Explained 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 8.872 19.715 19.715 8.872 19.715 19.715 
2 5.631 12.513 32.229 5.631 12.513 32.229 
3 3.676 8.168 40.397 3.676 8.168 40.397 
4 2.813 6.252 46.649 2.813 6.252 46.649 
5 2.481 5.512 52.161 2.481 5.512 52.161 
6 2.359 5.242 57.403    
7 2.230 4.956 62.359    
… … … …    
42 5.636E-16 1.252E-15 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Additional evidence on the extraction of the five factors was provided by the Scree plot below. 
Figure 4.1 represents the scree plot which determines the optimal number of components. This 
was plotted using the Eigen value of each component in the initial solution. Factors on the steep 
slope should be retained and those on the flat slope removed (Field, 2009). The components 







Figure 4.1: Scree plot 
 
Table 4.10 shows a summary of the factor loadings after rotating using a significant criterion 
of 4.10. Factor loadings explain the relationship between the underlying variables with each 
factor. The factors are arranged in the descending order based on the most explained variance. 
According the findings in table 4.10, factor one contains company specific variables. The 
company-specific factors have a strong correlation with profitability (0.567), complexity  
(0.490, 0.576), leverage (0.407), foreign ownership (0.421), ownership concentration (0.546, 
0.517), board size (0.633), gender diversity (0.544), number of meetings (0.693), number of 
non-executive directors (0.779), firm (0.462, 0.620) . This implies that factor 1 has very similar 
characteristics to these variables. 
 
Factor two contains auditor-related and corporate governance factors which have strong 
correlation with auditors’ fees (0.408), auditor type (0.440), size (0.556), gender diversity 
(0.535), financial expertise (0.511), number of independent members (0.456). This means that 
factor two had similar characteristics with these variables. Factor three contains auditor-related 
and company-specific variables characteristics and auditor experience with client has a 
correlation industry sector (0.552). This means that factor three had similar characteristics with 
industry sector. Factor four contains auditor-related factor and company-specific 
characteristics which have a strong correlation with audit risk (0.457), complexity (0.488). This 
means that factor four also had similar characteristics with audit risk and complexity. Factor 





audit fees (0.504), industry sector (0.402), and number of independent members (0.430). This 























factor and client 
complexity
FACTOR 5: 
Audit fees and 
governance
F1
Auditors take a longer time to release the 
audit report if they are paid lower fees
0.408 0.504
F3
Generally big 4 audit firms take a shorter 
period to release the audit report
0.44
F5
Auditors who follow a structured audit 
approach or established audit methodology 
have longer audit delays
0.766
F6
Auditors with a previous audit experience 




Previous audit experience with the client does 




If an auditor perceives high risk to their 
reputation in auditing a client, they take 
longer to release the audit report
0.457
F14
The size of a client firm does not influence the 
period taken to release the audit report
0.556
F15
Strong financial condition is associated with 
shorter audit report delays
0.567
F17




Companies with large inventory and 




Auditors take longer to release the audit report 
for firms in the financial sector
0.552
F22
 industry sector has no influence on the time 
taken to release the audit report
0.402
F25
Auditors take longer period to release the 
audit report for companies which are a high 
debt to equity ratio
0.407
F27
Auditors of companies with foreign ownership 
take a longer period to release the audit report
0.421
F28
Auditors take longer to audit firms with 




Auditors take longer to release the audit report 
for family owned companies
0.517
F32




ARL is shorter for companies with more than 




Auditors take longer to release audit reports 
where board of directors meet more than eight 
times in a year
0.693
F39




ARL is longer for companies with directors 
who have served as directors before
0.54 0.463
F41
ARL is longer for companies with directors 
who have financial expertise
0.511
F42
ARL is longer for companies with audit 





Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.






Table 4.11 presents findings from the open ended questions. The findings in table 4.11 revealed 
that some of the variables identified by the practitioners were similar to those identified by 
literature of the study. The company specific variables were: complexity of the company (Che-
Ahmad & Abidin, 2009), size and financial stability (Baatwah et al., 2015). The auditor-related 
factors were: audit risk (Sultana, Singh, & Mitchell Van der Zahn, 2015), financial expertise, 
audit fees, industry sector, financial stability (Mathuva, Mboya, & Mcfie, 2016), industry 
(Baatwah et al., 2015), audit fee (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2012). These findings are consistent 
with that of the factor analysis that identified the main components explaining the 
interrelationship among the variables in the questionnaire to be auditor-, company- and 
corporate governance related.   
However, there were variables identified by practitioners that were not identified by literature 
of the study. The auditor related characteristics were: use of Computer-Assisted Audit 
Techniques (CAATs), auditor expertise and experience, commitment of audit team, 
disagreements with management over matters arising in management letter, auditing of 
subsidiaries by a different auditor, audit planning and staffing, sample size, scope, audit 
methodology. The company-specific characteristics were: maturity of the company, 
geographical presence, management experience, client understanding of audit findings, speed 
of information provision, speed of management response to audit queries, nature of company, 
regulatory framework, business risk, organization of the client and management experience. 
These findings are consistent with findings from factor analysis that implied that audit-, 













Table 4.11: Summary results for open ended questions 
 










Management Support and 
Cooperation
Auditor Specialist Expertise in 
the Sector
Complexity of the Client
Number of Audit Staff 
Members performing the Audit
Geographical Presence
Commitment of the Audit 
Team
Management Experience
If Subsidiaries and Associates 
are Audited by Different 
Auditors not from the Network
Client Risk Rating by Auditor
Audit fees charged






4.10 Chapter summary 
The chapter began with an analysis of secondary data then primary data. Diagnostics tests were 
carried out to test for violation of OLS assumptions. The two-stage panel least squares 
regressions. Factor analysis was conducted on the results from the questionnaire. The chapter 
concluded with an analysis of the open ended questionnaire. Generally the findings showed a 
negative relation between ARL and: the auditor type, ROA, IS_Banking, IS_manufacturing 
and CGQS. The findings also show a positive association between ARL and IS_Investment. 
This implies that managers of listed companies should take advantage of selecting the 
appropriate auditor type given their resource capabilities and adopt strategies that would help 
maintain stable ROA such as increasing their revenue without increasing their asset costs. The 
Company’s Act 2015, the code of corporate practices for issuers of securities for the public 
2015 and regulations by the Central Bank of Kenya have enabled companies in the banking 
sector to have a favorable ARL. It is important for other sectors to adopt stringent regulation 
to improve timeliness of audit reports. The findings illustrate the importance of examining the 


















CHAPTER FIVE  
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter provided a summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations based on the 
research objectives and the existing empirical literature. The objectives were analyzing the 
influence of company–related factors, auditor-related factors, and corporate governance-
related factors on ARL by listed companies in Kenya. Furthermore, the study sought to obtain 
auditor and management perspectives on the drivers of ARL by listed companies in Kenya. 
5.2 Discussion of findings 
The purpose of the study was to examine the drivers of ARL in Kenyan listed companies. It 
was carried out using two-stage panel regression on four hundred and forty four firm year 
observations. The findings of the study were discussed below. 
5.2.1 The influence of auditor-related factors on ARL 
This study sought to establish the influence of auditor related variables on ARL of Kenyan 
listed companies. Model 1 which used fixed effects model revealed that the auditor type had a 
beta of -22.547 with p-value of 0.003 and significant implying that a change of auditor from a 
non-Big 4 firm to Big 4 firm caused a decrease of ARL of approximately 23 days. The final 
model using the random effects model selected auditor type as the most significant auditor 
related variable. The significant negative association was consistent with that found by 
Mohamad-Nor, Shafie and Wan-Hussin (2010). According to the findings auditor type had a 
beta of -19.331 and a p-value of 0.000 implying that it was highly significant. This implied that 
changing from a non-Big 4 audit firm to a Big 4 audit firm reduced the ARL by approximately 
20 days. These findings are consistent with prior studies which found that companies audited 
by big four audit firms tend to have shorter audit lags as compared to non-big four audit firms 
(Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991). However, according to findings from the questionnaire majority of 
the respondents indicated that the auditor type may not influence ARL. This implies that there 
may be other reasons practitioners consider other than auditor type on ARL. 
5.2.2 The effect of company related factors on ARL 
This study sought to establish the effect of company related variables on ARL of Kenyan listed 
companies. Model 2 using random effects model revealed that LNTA had a beta of -2.59 with 





in ARL of approximately 3 days. Profitability had a beta of -7.99 with a p-value of 0.07 
significant implying that companies that make profit have lesser ARL by approximately 8 days 
in comparison to los making companies. ROA had a beta of -74.525 with a p-value of 0.000 
significant implying that a unit change in ROA caused a decrease in ARL of 75 days. 
Companies in the banking sector had a beta -21.504 and p-value of 0.043 was significant 
implying that companies in the banking sector have a shorter ARL of approximately 22 days 
than other sectors. Companies in the Investment sector had a beta 26.005 with a p-value of 0.09 
significant implying that they had a longer ARL of approximately 26 days than other sectors. 
Companies in the manufacturing sector had a beta -20.393 with a p-value of 0.077 significant 
implying that they had a shorter ARL of approximately 26 days than other sectors. 
The final model used Panel regression, employing a random effects approach revealed ROA 
had a beta of -90.004 with a p-value 0.000 significant implying that unit change in ROA caused 
a decrease in ARL of 90 days. This was consistent with prior studies found a significant 
negative relationship (Baatwah et al., 2015). Companies in the banking sector had a beta of -
21.640 with a p-value 0.000 implying that their ARL was 22 days shorter than other listed other 
sectors. This is consistent with prior studies which found that banks tend to have shorter audit 
delays than companies in other sectors (Henderson & Kaplan, 2000). This implies that due to 
the heavy regulation in the banking sector banks are expected to have shorter ARL than other 
listed sectors. 
Companies in the investment sector had a beta of 22.370 with a p-value 0.000 significant 
meaning that they their ARL were 23 days longer than other listed sectors. Companies in the 
manufacturing sector had a beta of -17.11 with a p-value of 0.000 significant implying that 
their ARL was approximately 17 days shorter that other listed sectors. Practitioners’ 
perspective from the questionnaire shows that majority find that ROA companies in the 
banking, investment and manufacturing sector as having significant influence on ARL. 
5.2.3 The influence of corporate governance related factors on ARL 
This study sought to establish the influence of corporate governance related variables on ARL 
of Kenyan listed companies. Model 3 using random effects model found that the CGQS had a 
beta of -17.702 with p-value 0.092 significant this implies that a unit increase in corporate 
governance quality results in a decrease in ARL of approximately 18 days. Using random 
effects model the final model found that corporate governance quality was insignificant with a 





would result to a decrease in ARL of approximately 6 days. Findings from the questionnaire 
show that majority of the respondents corporate governance quality is significant in 
determining ARL. These findings show there is need for emphasis of corporate governance 
quality in Kenyan listed companies. 
5.2.4 Practitioners’ perspectives on ARL. 
The study used semi-structured questionnaires to obtain auditor and management perspectives. 
The findings from the questionnaire were analyzed using factor analysis. The findings from 
factor analysis indicated that auditor-, company specific- and corporate governance-related 
characteristics explained the interrelationship between the variables in the questionnaire.  
Results from the open-ended questionnaire revealed that some of the variables identified by 
the practitioners were similar to those identified by literature of the study. The company 
specific variables were: complexity of the company (Che-Ahmad & Abidin, 2009), size and 
financial stability (Baatwah et al., 2015). The auditor-related factors were: audit risk (Sultana, 
Singh, & Mitchell Van der Zahn, 2015), financial expertise, audit fees, industry sector, 
financial stability (Mathuva, Mboya, et al., 2016), industry (Baatwah et al., 2015), audit fee 
(Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2012). These findings are consistent with that of the factor analysis 
that identified the main components explaining the interrelationship among the variables in the 
questionnaire to be auditor-, company- and corporate governance related.   
However, there were variables identified by practitioners that were not identified by literature 
of the study. The auditor related characteristics were: use of Computer-Assisted Audit 
Techniques (CAATs), auditor expertise and experience, commitment of audit team, 
disagreements with management over matters arising in management letter, auditing of 
subsidiaries by a different auditor, audit planning and staffing, sample size, scope, audit 
methodology. The company-specific characteristics were: maturity of the company, 
geographical presence, management experience, client understanding of audit findings, speed 
of information provision, speed of management response to audit queries, nature of company, 
regulatory framework, business risk, organization of the client and management experience. 
These findings are consistent with findings from factor analysis that implied that audit-, 







This study guided by the agency theory, signaling theory and stakeholder theory reviewed 
literature on determinants of ARL and found auditor related variables, company specific 
variables and corporate governance variables that influenced ARL. Additionally, the study 
found interrelationships between the independent variables ARL and leverage. According to 
the findings ARL was significantly influenced by auditor type, ROA, companies in the 
banking, investment and manufacturing sectors and governance measured by corporate 
governance quality score. According to the findings these variables were significant influence 
on the ARL. This study finds that knowledge of the determinants of ARL is essential for Kenya 
listed companies in promoting efficiency in the corporate sector.  
5.4 Research implications 
5.4.1 Policy recommendations 
The findings of this study provide insights to policy makers and regulators interested in 
increasing awareness of the importance of focusing on the type of auditor return on assets, 
industry sector and corporate governance quality as significant drivers of ARL. These insights 
may act as catalysts for economic growth because they may reduce information asymmetry 
between managers and end users of audited financial reports. 
5.4.2 Managerial recommendations 
Given the importance of the auditor type managers need to ensure that they exercise caution in 
selecting the appropriate auditor and not only focusing on audit fees which was found not to 
be a significant driver of ARL. Additionally, given the significance of ROA managers should 
maintain good and stable ROA by increasing revenue without increasing asset costs.  The 
findings imply managers should dedicate resources to continuous improvement of corporate 
governance quality for example having a corporate governance committee so as to nurture and 
enhance a culture of timely reporting of audited financial reports. 
5.5 Contribution to knowledge  
In advancement of the Agency theory, this study performed a comprehensive analysis of the 
drivers of ARL in a developing country, Kenya. The study employed a two-stage panel least 
squares regressions to determine the drivers of ARL in Kenya.  Prior studies investigated the 
individual characteristics of corporate governance. The study contributes to literature by 
incorporating the corporate governance and audit committee quality indices as composite 





5.6 Areas of further studies 
The study relied heavily on annual reports as the main source for the drivers of ARL. Further 
studies can use other platforms for accessing drivers of ARL such as the internet, focus groups 
and publications. In determining the drivers of ARL the study used a binary coding system. 
Despite its popularity in prior studies it has its limitations. Future studies can consider other 
coding system such as effects or contrast coding.  
5.7 Limitations of the study 
A number of limitations were encountered during the study. Due to unavailability of some 
annual reports the study used unbalanced panel data. This provides an avenue for further 
studies to investigate drivers of ARL using balanced panel data. The study removed some 
companies from the study because they were delisted or suspended or listed quite late into the 
period of study. However, this allows future research to investigate on these companies. The 
study focused on the drivers of ARL in a developing country, Kenya. Due to the different 
culture, regulatory frameworks, institutional set ups and country specific factors it may not 
possible to generalize findings since it was constrained to Kenya and may differ with other 
countries. Prior studies have measured ARL as the number of days from the financial year end 
to when the audit report date is released this is not the most accurate measure of ARL since the 
actual date that the audit work began may not be the financial year end. Future research can 
use a different measure of ARL that captures the exact date the audit began to when the audit 
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Appendix II: Questionnaire  
 
Dear Participant, 
My name is Fredrick J. Otieno a Master of Commerce student at Strathmore University 
conducting a research on “The drivers of ARL by Kenyan listed companies”. At this point of 
my proposal I am concerned with collecting data from practitioners in audit firms and listed 
companies that should lead to insights and recommendations for practitioners, investors and 
Academicians. Your contribution will go a long way in achieving the objectives of this study. 
I would be grateful if you could spare some time to fill this questionnaire. I assure you that all 
information provided for this study will be treated with strict confidentiality and will be used 
for the sole purpose of this research. For any queries my contacts are: fotieno@strathmore.edu 
or fotieno50@gmail.com 
SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION 
The information in this section will serve as background to the answers that will be provided 
in the other sections. 
1. Kindly tick against your gender.    Male        [    ]              Female [    ] 
2. Kindly indicate your main occupation?   
Finance manager [    ] Accountant   [    ] Internal auditor [    ] External auditor [    ]    
Other ……………………………… 
3. Length of experience in this position? 
Less than 1 year [   ] Between 1 to 4 years  [    ] Between 5 to 10 years [    ] Between 11 to 15 
years   [     ]    Over 15 years [     ] 
4.  Which professional certification do you hold? (CPA, ACCA, CFA, CFE etc 
)…………............. 
SECTION B: AUDITOR RELATED FACTORS 
The purpose of this section is to establish the audit related factors that affect the period taken 
to complete an audit. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 





 1 2 3 4 5 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Auditors are likely to take a longer time to 
release the audit report  if they are paid lower 
fees 
     
Generally audit fees have no effect on the time taken to release 
the audit report 
     
Generally big 4 audit firms take a shorter period 
to release the audit report   
     
The type of auditor has no influence on the time 
taken to release the audit report   
     
Previous audit experience with the client does 
not affect the time taken to release the audit 
report   
     
If an auditor perceives high risk to their 
reputation in auditing a client, they take longer 
to release the audit report 
     
Audit risk perception by auditors does not 
influence the time taken to release the audit 
report 
     
 
SECTION C: COMPANY SPECIFIC FACTORS 
The purpose of this section is to establish the company specific factors that affect the period 
taken to complete an audit. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements by ticking the cell that corresponds to your choice. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Auditors who audit large firms take a longer 
period to release the audit report   
     
The size of a client firm does not influence the 
period taken to release the audit report   
     
Companies with strong financial condition are 
associated with shorter audit report delays 
     
Generally the financial condition of the firm does 
not affect the time taken to release the audit report   
     
Auditors take longer to release audit report for 
companies with more than one subsidiary 
     
Companies with large inventory and receivables 
take longer to release the audit report   
     
The size  of inventory and receivables does not 
affect the time taken release the audit report   
     
Auditors take longer to release the audit report  for 
firms in the financial sector  





Auditors take shorter period to release the audit 
report  for firms in the non-financial sector 
     
Generally the industry sector has no influence on 
the time taken to release the audit report   
     
Auditors of companies that have issued profit 
warnings take a shorter period release the audit 
report   
     
The issuance of a profit warnings has no effect on 
the time taken release the audit report   
     
Auditors take longer period to release the audit 
report for companies which are high debt to equity 
ratio 
     
The debt to equity  ratio of a firm does not affect 
the time taken to release the audit report  
     
Auditors of companies with foreign ownership 
generally take a longer period to release the audit 
report   
     
Auditors take longer to audit firms with directors 
who own majority of the firm’s shares 
     
Auditors take longer to release the audit report for 
family owned companies 
     
Auditors take a shorter  period Family owned or 
controlled companies to release audit reports 
     
Generally, auditors take longer to release audit 
reports for publicly listed companies 
     
 
SECTION D: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RELATED FACTORS 
The purpose of this section is to establish the drivers of ARL that are related to corporate 
governance. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements by ticking the cell that corresponds to your choice 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Auditors tend to take longer to release audit 
reports for companies with more than five board 
members    
     
Board size does not affect the time taken to 
release audit reports   
     
Auditors tend to take longer to release audit 
report for companies with more than a third of 
the board members being from one gender 
     
The gender of the board members does not affect 
the time taken to release the audit report 





Auditors tend to take longer to release audit 
reports where board of directors meet more than 
four times in a year 
     
The number of times board of directors meet 
does not affect the time taken to release the audit 
report 
     
Auditors take longer period to release audit 
reports for companies with few non-executive 
directors 
     
Auditors take a longer period to release audit 
reports for companies with directors who have 
served as directors before 
     
Auditors take a longer period to release audit 
reports for companies with directors who have 
financial expertise 
     
Auditors take a longer period to release audit 
reports for companies with audit committee of 
three or more independent members 
     
 
 
SECTION F: TIME TAKEN BY AUDITORS TO RELEASE AUDIT REPORT 
1.   In your opinion what is the average time it takes auditors to complete and audit? 
Between 0-30 days [   ]    Between 31- 60 days [   ] Between 61 – 90 days [   ] Between 91-120 
days [   ]    Between 120-150 days [   ]     
Other ………………… 












Appendix III: Companies included in the study 
 
Source: NSE (2016)  
 
BAT  MANUFACTURING & ALLIED 31-Dec-16 25-Feb-17 47
Kapchorua  AGRICULTURAL 31-Mar-12 15-Aug-12 198
Kakuzi  AGRICULTURAL 31-Dec-15 16-Mar-16 75
Limuru T.  AGRICULTURAL 31-Dec-12 16-Mar-13 75
Sasini  AGRICULTURAL 30-Sep-15 16-Dec-15 77
William T.  AGRICULTURAL 31-Mar-12 28-May-12 89
Car and G.  AUTOMOBILES AND ACCESSORIES 30-Sep-15 17-Dec-15 78
Sameer  AUTOMOBILES AND ACCESSORIES 31-Dec-15 7-Apr-16 97
Barclays  BANKING 31-Dec-15 4-Apr-16 94
I&M  BANKING 31-Dec-15 22-Mar-16 81
DTB  BANKING 31-Dec-15 10-Mar-16 69
HF Group  BANKING 31-Dec-15 24-Feb-16 55
KCB  BANKING 31-Dec-15 1-Mar-16 60
Nat. B  BANKING 31-Dec-15 31-Mar-16 90
NIC  BANKING 31-Dec-15 3-Mar-16 62
SCB  BANKING 31-Dec-15 23-Mar-16 82
Equity  BANKING 31-Dec-15 29-Mar-16 88
Co-op  BANKING 31-Dec-15 31-Mar-16 90
Express  COMMERCIAL AND SERVICES 31-Dec-15 29-Apr-16 88
Kenya A.  COMMERCIAL AND SERVICES 31-Mar-15 29-Aug-15 151
Nation M.  COMMERCIAL AND SERVICES 31-Dec-15 18-Mar-16 77
Standard  COMMERCIAL AND SERVICES 31-Dec-15 24-Mar-16 83
TPS EA.  COMMERCIAL AND SERVICES 31-Dec-15 28-Apr-16 118
Scan G  COMMERCIAL AND SERVICES 31-Dec-15 27-Apr-16 117
Athi R.  CONSTRUCTION AND ALLIED 31-Dec-15 29-Apr-16 119
Bamburi  CONSTRUCTION AND ALLIED 31-Dec-15 28-Apr-16 118
Crown  CONSTRUCTION AND ALLIED 31-Dec-15 29-Apr-16 119
EA Cables  CONSTRUCTION AND ALLIED 31-Dec-15 10-Feb-16 41
EA Port  CONSTRUCTION AND ALLIED 30-Jun-15 22-Oct-15 114
Kenol K  ENERGY AND PETROLEUM 31-Dec-15 17-Mar-16 76
Total K  ENERGY AND PETROLEUM 31-Dec-15 1-Apr-16 94
KenGen  ENERGY AND PETROLEUM 30-Jun-15 12-Oct-15 104
Kenya P.  ENERGY AND PETROLEUM 30-Jun-15 29-Oct-15 121
Jubilee  INSURANCE 31-Dec-15 31-Mar-16 90
Pan Afr.  INSURANCE 31-Dec-15 9-Mar-16 68
Kenya Re  INSURANCE 31-Dec-15 27-Mar-16 86
Liberty  INSURANCE 31-Dec-15 7-Apr-16 97
Olympia  INVESTMENT 28-Feb-15 19-Sep-15 203
Centum  INVESTMENT 31-Mar-15 7-Jun-15 68
EABL  MANUFACTURING & ALLIED 30-Jun-15 30-Jul-15 30
Mumias  MANUFACTURING & ALLIED 30-Jun-15 28-Oct-15 120
Unga  MANUFACTURING & ALLIED 30-Jun-15 30-Oct-15 121
Eveready  MANUFACTURING & ALLIED 30-Sep-15 30-Jan-16 122
Safcom  TELECOMMUNICATION AND TECHNOLOGY 31-Mar-15 6-May-15 36









Appendix IV: Corporate governance quality index 
No Description Criteria Score Criteria Score 
1 Size of board of directors => 8 1 <8 0 
2 Number of  board meetings in a year  > 5 1 <5 0 
3 Training of board members Yes  1 No 0 




< 1/3 of 
total 
0 
5 Presence of audit committee Yes 1 No 0 
6 Size of audit committee  =>3 1 < 3 0 
7 
Number of audit committee meetings per 
year 
=> 4 1 < 4 0 
8 Relevant qualification of AC members Yes 1 No 0 
9 Presence of compensation committee  Yes 1 No 0 
10 
CEO member of compensation 
committee 
No 1 Yes 0 








Presence of committees other than the 
board of directors, audit and 
compensation committee 
Yes 1 No 0 
 
Source: The code of corporate practices for issuers of securities for the public 2015,  Mathuva, 














Appendix V: Audit committee quality index 











>3 1 > 3  0 
3 
Size of AC 
board 
>3 1 > 3 0 
4 
Number of 
meetings in a 
year 








Yes 1 No 0 
 































































Appendix IX: Regression standardized residual for ARL 
 
 
 
